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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of a "fair trial" is embodied in the Bill of Rights. No
provision of the Bill of Rights is any more important to an individual
accused of a crime than the requirement that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."' The ultimate penalty this country allows for committing a
crime is death. For more than 60 years states have been required to
provide counsel for those tried for crimes punishable by death.2 This
Article is not meant to comment, pro or con, on the propriety of the
death penalty as a punishment, but to recognize that if we, as a soci-
ety, decide to end the life of an individual for criminal convictions, the
decision should be based on a "fair trial" - because with death we
get no second chance if we are wrong.' Providing effective counsel
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
3. A report of the Judicial Conference of the United States noted:
Studies of public opinion establish that an overwhelming majority of our citi-
zens favors the death penalty for certain murders. The Supreme Court has made
clear that the evolving standards of decency embodied in the Eighth Amendment
permit the imposition of this punishment for some offenders. Of course, both Court
and society have recognized that, because it is irreversible, death is a unique pun-
ishment This realization demands safeguards to ensure that capital punishment is
administered with the utmost reliability and fairness.
[Vol. 98:863
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for capital defendants is the pivotal step to ensure that a death penalty
conviction is "fair" and constitutionally implemented.
The death penalty is society's most vehement response to the com-
mission of particularly heinous crimes. Statistics indicate that it is im-
plemented with a racial bias. Because of the penalty's unique severity
it requires special procedures and post-conviction oversight not found
with any other criminal proceeding. Attorneys involved in death penal-
ty representation should be familiar with and trained in this specialized
litigation.
The complexity of the litigation dictates that competent counsel be
identified, compensated and retained by the state for those defendants
who cannot afford it. Many states, however, do not ensure that indi-
gent death penalty defendants are provided counsel who are equal to
the task, that is, competent, experienced and effective. Death penalty
appeals clog the court dockets in part because of the inability of coun-
sel to effectively represent their clients in trial or present their cases in
post-conviction appeals.
Post Conviction Defender Organizations (PCDOs) were created by
Congress in 1988 to provide a service that would identify, train and
support competent death penalty counsel in state and federal proceed-
ings. The PCDOs ensured that death penalty defendants had counsel at
every stage of the litigation, and that the counsel had the information
needed for adequate representation. The cost was fairly minimal, but
nevertheless, it prevented executions based on ineffective counsel rather
than actual guilt.
PCDOs will no longer be funded by the federal government after
September 30, 1996. This decision by Congress threatens to return the
court system to a time of inadequately represented capital defendants
with appeals clogging the courts. This article will review some of the
history of the death penalty prior to the establishment of PCDOs and
the effect of these federally funded organizations on litigation since
their inception.
REPORT AND PROPOSAL OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES 1 (1989) [hereinafter THE POWELL REPORT].
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This article discusses how PCDOs brought trained and supported
counsel to the defendant's table that were equal to the well-trained and
funded government side, a phenomenon that was not present for indi-
gent defendants prior to 1988. By defunding the PCDOs, the govern-
ment almost ensures that a death penalty trial will result in a death
penalty conviction. For the indigent, the trial is reduced to a technicali-
ty on the way to the gallows instead of being a hard-fought battle for
the truth. The responsibility of finding competent counsel for indigent
defendants will fall back on the states, but this article discusses how
many of the states have, historically, abdicated that responsibility.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Supreme Court Decisions Leading to the Death Penalty
On June 29, 1972, the Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 per curiam
decision, held in Furman v. Georgia' that the death penalty was cruel
and unusual punishment and thus violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.' Historically, the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punishment did not include the
punishment of death as practiced in this country when the Constitution
was written.' Initially, the Court was inclined to interpret the Eighth
Amendment by the practices and standards existing in 1789.' Death
was a "traditional" punishment, which "[had] been employed through-
out our [country's] history."8 However, the Court eventually recog-
nized that the Eighth Amendment was "progressive, and . . . not fas-
tened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion be-
comes enlightened by a humane justice"9 and should be interpreted in
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. Id. at 240; Stephen R. McAllister, The Problem of Implementing A Constitutional
System of Capital Punishment, 43 KAN. L. REv. 1039, 1049-51 (1995).
6. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 370 (1910) (citing In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 437 (1890)) ("Punishments are cruel and unusual when they in-
volve torture or a lingering death: but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there is something inhuman and
barbarous, and something more than the mere extinguishment of life.").
7. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 437.
8. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-100 (1958).
9. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378.
[Vol. 98:863
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view of "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."1 The Court eschews subjective judgment to deter-
mine the standards of society and looks for "objective indicia that
reflect the public attitude toward a given [criminal] sanction"" and
that "[flirst among these indicia are the decisions of state legisla-
tures ... ,12
In Furman v. Georgia, the Court held that two state legislatures
had exceeded the bounds of the Eighth Amendment. The Court did
not strike down the death penalty itself as a per se violation of the
Eighth Amendment, but found that death penalty statutes that provided
the trial judge or petit jury unfettered discretion to determine whether
to impose the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment
as proscribed in that Amendment." Justice White observed in a con-
curring opinion that:
death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck
by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes
and murders in [the years that the petitioners committed their crimes],
many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capricious-
ly selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact
been imposed. 5
Indeed, the death penalty was regarded as a traditional punishment,
but for only selected groups in this country. Justice Douglas stated in
his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia that:
What the legislature may not do for all classes uniformly and systemati-
cally, a judge or jury may not do for a class that prejudice sets apart from
the community.
There is increasing recognition of the fact that the basic theme of
equal protection is implicit in "cruel and unusual" punishments. "A penal-
10. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
11. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173-75 (1976).
12. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987).
13. See McAllister, supra note 5 at 1039-40 (discussing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972)).
14. Id. at 1044-45.
15. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
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ty ... should be considered 'unusually' imposed if It is administered
arbitrarily or discriminatorily."'
16
The Court went on to add that "[t]he extreme rarity with which appli-
cable death penalty provisions are put to use raises a strong inference
of arbitrariness."' 7
Justice Douglas cited a study which concluded:
Finally there is evidence that the imposition of the death sentence
and the exercise of dispensing power by the courts and the executive fol-
low discriminatory patterns. The death sentence is disproportionately im-
posed and carried out on the poor, the Negro, and the members of unpop-
ular groups.";
Justice Douglas also relied on a study of capital cases in Texas from
1924 to 1968 which reached equally troubling conclusions:
Application of the death penalty is unequal: most of those executed were
poor, young, and ignorant.
Seventy-five of the 460 cases involved codefendants, who, under
Texas law, were given separate trials. In several instances where a white
and a Negro were co-defendants, the white was sentenced to life imprison-
ment or a term of years, and the Negro was given the death penalty.
Another ethnic disparity is found in the type of sentence imposed for
rape. The Negro convicted of rape is far more likely to get the death
penalty than a term sentence, whereas whites and Latins are far more
likely to get a term sentence than the death penalty.'9
Justice Douglas cited a 1928 statement by Warden Lewis E. Lawes of
Sing Sing Federal Prison, who said:
16. Id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M.
Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1773, 1790
(1970)).
17. Id. (quoting Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Pen-
alty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1773, 1792 (1970)).
18. Id. at 249-50 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN.
OF JusTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SoCIETY 143 (1967)).
19. Id. at 250-51.
[Vol. 98:863
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Not only does capital punishment fail in its justification, but no pun-
ishment could be invented with so many inherent defects. It is an unequal
punishment in the way it is applied to the rich and to the poor. The de-
fendant of wealth and position never goes to the electric chair or to the
gallows. Juries do not intentionally favour the rich, the law is theoretically
impartial, but the defendant with ample means is able to have his case
presented with every favourable aspect, while the poor defendant often has
a lawyer assigned by the court. Sometimes such assignment is considered
part of political patronage; usually the lawyer assigned has had no experi-
ence whatever in a capital case.2"
Justice Douglas' opinion cited former Attorney General Ramsey Clark
who said in 1970: "It is the poor, the sick, the ignorant, the powerless
and the hated who are executed."'" The Court found that "[o]ne [can]
search[] our chronicles in vain for the execution of any member of the
affluent strata of this society. The Leopolds and Loebs are given prison
terms, 22 not sentenced to death. '23 Nevertheless, the death penalty re-
20. Furman, 408 U.S. at 251 (footnotes omitted). The death penalty is often consid-
ered a politically charged topic for elected officials, as well as judges who are subject to
state elections. It is often "politics" that dictate the availability or invocation of the death
penalty. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L.
REv. 759 (1995).
21. Id. (footnote omitted).
22. This reference is to the 1924 murder trial in Chicago of Richard Loeb, an 18-
year-old post-graduate student at the University of Chicago as well as the youngest graduate
of the University of Michigan, and his lover, 19 year old Nathan Leopold, a law student at
the University of Chicago. The defendants were sons of wealthy Chicago families and self-
proclaimed geniuses, who were charged with bludgeoning to death the 14-year-old son of a
millionaire neighbor of the defendants who was Loeb's cousin. The defendants wanted to
commit the "perfect murder" merely for "the thrill of it." Thus, they randomly picked the
young boy as their victim. The trial was referred to as the "The Trial of the Century" and
the defendants' families retained the legendary attorney Clarence Darrow to represent them
for an agreed-upon fee of $100,000. Darrow unexpectedly pled the defendants guilty to the
murder at the start of the trial, thus sparing the defendants the wrath of a jury and allowing
the presiding judge to determine the sentence. Darrow's impassioned allocution spared the
defendants the death penalty. Both defendants received life sentences for the murder and 99
years for kidnapping. Loeb was murdered in prison in 1936. Leopold had his sentence re-
duced in gratitude for his contributions in testing malaria during the war and was paroled in
1958. He migrated to Puerto Rico and died in 1971. Darrow died in 1938 having collected
only $40,000 of his fee. See EDWARD W. KNAPPMAN, GREAT AMERICAN TRIALS 307-11
(1993).
23. Furman, 408 U.S. at 251-52.
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mained an option and could be implemented if the states could devise
a statute that provided more guidance to the jurors and court on how it
was to be implemented.
Four years after Furman v. Georgia, the Court reviewed the death
penalty statutes of three states and approved Georgia's capital punish-
ment statute in Gregg v. Georgia24 as fulfilling the Court's mandate
for guidance for the sentencing authority." The Court sanctioned
Georgia's invocation of capital punishment because the statute required
the sentencing authority, before imposing the death penalty, to find at
least one aggravating factor listed in the promulgated death penalty
statute while considering the circumstances of the crime and the back-
ground of the defendant in mitigation of implementing the death penal-
ty.26 The statute was found to be appropriate since it also provided
for judicial review of the decision.2 ' This decision cleared the way for
the reimposition of the death penalty as a punishment option in this
country. The states and the federal government did just that in the
years that followed.
B. The Death Penalty as a "Magnet" for Minorities
Since Gregg v. Georgia, forty jurisdictions have passed statutes
providing for capital punishment.28 This legislative action was recog-
nized as "[t]he most marked endorsement of the death penalty for
murder"2' 9 There have been three hundred and two executions since
24. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
25. See McAllister, supra note 5, at 1052-53.
26. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-68.
27. Id. at 206-07.
28. Those jurisdictions are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, The Unit-
ed States Government, and The United States Military. Thirteen jurisdictions do not have
capital punishment: Alaska, The District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INc., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 1 (1995) [here-
inafter 1995 DEATH Row, U.S.A.].
29. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179.
[Vol. 98:863
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Gregg v. Georgia reinstituted the death penalty in this country." Un-
fortunately, little has changed in the application of the death penalty
since Furman v. Georgia.
Since 1976, black defendants have made up 39.4 percent of the
defendants executed, Latinos have made up 16 percent, and one Native
American was executed; meanwhile, whites made up almost 55 percent
of the executed defendants. 1 However, almost 83 percent of the 408
victims of those executed were white, while less than 13 percent were
black, 3.43 percent were Latino, and 1.22 percent were Asian.32 This
is true despite the fact that only 50 percent of the murder victims are
white.3
Of those executed since Gregg v. Georgia, 57.35 percent of the
defendant/victim racial combinations involved a white defendant and a
white victim, and 23.53 percent involved a black defendant and white
victim.3 4 On the other hand, less than one percent of the defen-
dant/victim combinations involved a white defendant and a black vic-
tim, while 11.52 percent involved a black defendant and a black vic-
tim.
35
Of the 3,046 inmates on death row, half are minorities.36 The
cruelty of the death penalty takes on less of the random characteristics
30. 1995 DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra note 28, at 3.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (1995) [here-
inafter FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY].
34. 1995 DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra note 28, at 3.
35. Id. White defendants and Asian victims make up 0.49% of the executed death
penalty cases since 1976, white defendants and Latino victims or other victims make up
1.22% of the cases, black defendants and Asian victims make up 0.49% of the cases, black
defendants and Latino victims make up 0.24% of the cases, Latino defendants and white
victims make up 1.96% of the cases, Latino defendants and Latino victims make up 1.71%
of the cases, Latino defendants and Asian victims make up 0.24% of the cases, and the
lone Native American executed had a white victim, which constitutes 0.24% of the cases.
Id.
36. One thousand two hundred and thirty five (40.54%) of the death row inmates are
black, 234 are Latin (7.68%), 52 are Native American (1.71%), 24 are Asian (0.79%) and
25 are presently unknown (0.82%). One thousand four hundred and seventy six (48.46%)
death row inmates are white. Id. at 1.
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of "lightning," as the Court noted in Furman v. Georgia," and more
of the select characteristics of a "magnet." The cases involving black
defendants and/or white victims "attract" the penalty more so than
other cases. This is not to argue that the penalty is undeserved or de-
served in any of the 302 instances in which it has been employed, but
to note that the concerns expressed in Furman v. Georgia in 1972 are
still present today.
In 1990, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), in a
report to Congress, did an evaluation of all potentially relevant state,
local, and national studies on death penalty sentencing since the
Furman decision to determine if the race of either the victim or the
defendant influences the likelihood that defendants will be sentenced to
death.3 The GAO's synthesis of the twenty-three relevant studies
showed that race plays a role in sentencing.9 In the relevant studies,
the GAO found that there was "a pattern of evidence indicating racial
disparities in the charging, sentencing, and imposition of the death
penalty after the Furman decision."40 The report concluded that "[i]n
82 percent of the studies, [the] race of [the] victim was found to influ-
ence the likelihood of being charged with murder or receiving the
death penalty, that is, those who murdered whites were found to be
more likely to be sentenced to death than those who murdered
blacks."'" The study found that the race of the victim had the greatest
influence at the earlier stages of the judicial process, such as the
prosecutor's decision whether to charge the defendant with a capital
offense or to offer a plea to the defendant rather than proceed with the
trial.4" However, the race of the victim was found to be an influence
37. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10.
38. The report was provided to Congress as required by The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, which called fbr the GAO to determine if the race of victim or defendant influences
the imposition of the death penalty. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SEN-
TENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 1 (1990) [hereinafter
DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING].
39. Id. at 5-6.
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id. (footnote omitted).
42. Id. at 5-6.
[Vol. 98:863
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on charging decisions in death penalty cases at all stages of the crimi-
nal justice system process.43
The Court had already directly addressed the issue of racial dispar-
ity in death penalty sentencing in McCleskey v. Kemp." McCleskey, a
black man, was convicted in Fulton County, Georgia in 1978 on two
counts of armed robbery and the murder of a white police officer.45
McCleskey presented a statistical study showing that, in the state of
Georgia, defendants charged with killing white victims received the
death penalty more frequently than defendants charged with killing
black victims; that black defendants convicted of killing white victims
were much more likely to receive the death penalty than any other
black/white racial combination of defendants and victims; and that in
70 percent of the cases involving black defendants and white victims
the Georgia prosecutors have sought the death penalty (compared to 32
percent of the cases involving white defendants and white victims, 15
percent of the cases involving black defendants and white victims, and
19 percent of the cases involving white defendants and black vic-
tims).46  The study "indicat[ed] that black defendants, such as
McCleskey, who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of
receiving the death penalty."47
The McCleskey Court found that these statistics only show "a
likelihood" that race entered into the decision to impose the sentence
of death on McCleskey.48 Nevertheless, the Court found that "[t]here
is, of course, some risk of racial prejudice influencing a jury's decision
in a [death penalty] case." '49 According to the Court, "[a]t most,
the . . . study indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with
race. Apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our
criminal justice system. The discrepancy indicated by [this] study is a
'far cry from the major systematic defects identified in Furman."'5
43. DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING, supra note 38, at 5.
44. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
45. Id. at 283.
46. Id. at 286-87.
47. Id. at 287.
48. Id. at 308.
49. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308.
50. Id. at 312-13 (quoting Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984)) (footnote omit-
11
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The Court noted that any mode of implementing the death penalty
"has . . . the potential for misuse."'" However, to eliminate the jury's
exercise of "difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy codifica-
tion" or "the capacity of prosecutorial discretion to provide individual-
ized justice" would create a capital punishment system, devoid of dis-
cretionary acts, that "would be totally alien to our notions of criminal
justice."52 The Court noted that McCleskey's challenge is applicable to
all criminal punishment and all sorts of factors other than race, there-
fore without any limiting principal to his challenge the Court refused
to recognize its validity. 3 The Supreme Court, in essence, told minor-
ities they must live with racially implemented death.
With McCleskey v. Kemp the need for competent representation
heightened. Moreover, those death penalty defendants placed on trial in
the south faced steeper challenges. Southern states have executed over
80 percent of the death row inmates since 1976."4 The number of
executions in the south have earned it the moniker of the "Death Belt."
The propriety of death sentences in the South have come under ques-
tion since state courts in this area have had difficulty providing consti-
tutionally acceptable trials,55 and, the states themselves seek strict en-
forcement of procedural bars to state appellate review of death penalty
convictions in order to carry out the sentences. 6 This Article de-
scribes a number of cases in the South where the states used constitu-
tionally impermissible tactics to secure convictions. Competent repre-
sentation becomes paramount for the death row defendant in the face
of this sort of effort by the states to "ramrod" death penalty convic-
tions through trial and post-conviction review. This "Death Belt" has
ted).
51. Id. at 313 (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965)).
52. Id. at 311-12 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 314-19; McAllister, supra note 5, at 1087.
54. The states, in order of number of executions, are: Texas (100), Florida (34), Vir-
ginia (27), Louisiana (22), Georgia (20), Alabama (12), Arkansas (11), North Carolina (8),
South Carolina (5), and Mississippi (4). 1995 DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra note 28, at 4-10.
55. Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery - Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in
Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REV.
679, 682 (1990).
56. Id. at 682-83.
[Vol. 98:863
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been described as an area "where fairness is more like the random flip
of a coin than a delicate balancing of the scales of justice.
5 7
C. The Lessons of Furman v. Georgia Revisited
Recent legal history also echoes the lesson of Furman v. Georgia:
the death penalty is reserved for those without adequate representation
in court. 8 Two of the most infamous criminal murder trials in histo-
ry, the trials of O.J. Simpson and Susan Smith, took place during the
past year. The O.J. Simpson trial demonstrated that the impact of com-
petent, aggressive representation at the earliest stages of the criminal
justice system cannot be underestimated. The Susan Smith trial demon-
strated how an accused benefits from knowledgeable representation in
the courtroom.
The world was captivated by the trial of People v. Simpson.9
The defendant, a former college Heisman Trophy winner from the
University of Southern California, a well-known former professional
football player and television and movie personality, was charged with
the brutal murders of his estranged white wife and a local white wait-
er. Simpson, who is black, had accumulated and had access to substan-
tial financial assets." He, therefore, had the financial resources to as-
semble the so-called "Dream Team" of criminal defense attorneys to
represent him." Simpson, who was eventually acquitted,' never
faced the prospect of the death penalty because the Los Angeles Coun-
ty prosecutor's office made the decision before trial not to seek the
57. Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death Belt,
12 NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30. Stephanie Saul, Death Penalty Roulette: When Death
is the Penalty Attorneys for the Poor Defendants Often Lack Experience and Skill,
NE\vSDAY, Nov. 26, 1991, at 8.
58. 408 U.S. at 251-52.
59. No. BA-097211 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles Cty., Oct 3, 1995).
60. Gale Holland, For Simpson, Money Picture Not That Dim, USA TODAY, Oct 23,
1995, at 3A.
61. Id.
62. Linda Deutsch, LA Jury Acquits Simpson; Spellbound Nation Watches 372-Day
Murder Trial End, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 4, 1995, at 1.
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death penalty in this case.63  Presumably the formidability of
Simpson's defense team played a role in that decision.
Susan Smith was a young white woman from South Carolina who
publicly pleaded for the return of her two young sons, ages three and
one, who she had said were carjacked by a young black assailant, only
later to confess that she had sent her offspring to a watery grave. 4
Concern for the safety of the young boys gripped the nation before
Smith's confession and the cruelty of her acts shocked the collective
consciousness of the country after her admission. Smith faced the death
penalty, yet she eluded the electric chair 5 despite the senselessness of
the crime, the vulnerability of her victims, and the cold-blooded care-
lessness of her original pleas to the public. Smith, who did not testify,
had an ,experienced death penalty attorney who expertly gave the jury
her background of depression, abuse and abandonment at a young age,
her father's suicide when she was six years old, molestation by her
stepfather when she was young and a sexual relationship with him that
continued until just before the murders, her own suicide attempts and
extramarital affairs.66 Smith's attorney understood the use of mitigat-
ing factors in the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial, and expert-
ly provided them to the jury. All twelve jurors voted to spare her life,
when only one juror was needed to prevent the implementation of the
death penalty. 7 Smith is now serving a life sentence. 8 Smith had
the luxury of a family that could afford a skilled and competent death
penalty attorney to help her with her case. 9
63. Jim Newton & Ralph Frammolino, Prosecution Won't Seek the Death Penalty
Against Simpson: District Attorney Will Ask for Life in Prison Without Parole, Defense Says
It Can Now Concentrate on Winning Acquittal for Ex-Football Star, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10,
1994, at IA.
64. Chris Burritt & Jack Warner, The Susan Smith Case, An End to Ordeal of Trial,
Not Conscience Life in Prison, Lifelong Torment?, ATLANTA CONST., July 29, 1995, at A10.
65. South Carolina uses electrocution to implement the death penalty. 1995 DEATH
Row, U.S.A., supra note 28, at 13.
66. Elizabeth Gleik, No Casting Stones: Susan Smith Sentenced To Life Imprisonment,
TIME, Aug. 8, 1995, at 31.
67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
68. Burritt & Warner, supra note 64.
69. See generally Richard C. Dieter, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., WITH JUSTICE FOR
FEW: THE GROWING CRISIS IN DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION 1 (1995) [hereinafter
WITH JUSTICE FOR FEW].
[Vol. 98:863
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Simpson and Smith could afford competent counsel. They were
spared the death penalty. The aura of Loeb and Leopold was present
again with these two trials.7"
III. REPRESENTATION IN DEATH PENALTY CASES
A. Death Penalty Procedures are Difficult to Master
Because of the enormity of the penalty, and "the Eighth
Amendment's requirement of heightened reliability in capital cases,"71
death penalty litigation has evolved into a practice that is not only
ominous in its final outcome, but also "extraordinarily complex...
for both the courts and the trial attorneys."72 Death penalty trials con-
tain unique procedures such as special jury voir dire questions, presen-
tation of evidence in the guilt phase and in a separate punishment
phase, and special penalty procedures in the punishment phase.73
Moreover, appellate review may involve proportionality challenges
under state as well as federal post-conviction proceedings; challenges to
the competency of trial counsel to fairly and adequately represent the
death row inmate; and issues of when stays of execution may be
granted to allow additional time for consideration of the merits of
appellate petitions.74 Death penalty post-conviction litigation has the
complicated issues of procedural default of possible appellate claims,
70. Another statistical bias of capital punishment is that it is a crime reserved almost
exclusively for men. Although 2,000 women commit murders each year, only about 1% of
them are sentenced to death, and about 98% of those convictions are overturned on appeal.
Only one woman has been executed since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976 (in
North Carolina in 1984) and just 29 women have been executed in the past 278 years.
Gerrie Ferris et al., The Susan Smith Case: Women Who Kill Usualty Escape Ultimate Pen-
alty, ATLANTA CONST., July 29, 1995, at A10. Of the 3,046 death row inmates today, only
49 are women (1.61%). 1995 DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra note 28, at 1. Again, the death
penalty appears to be reserved for defendants with certain characteristics.
71. Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State
Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 55 (1990).
72. McAllister, supra note 5, at 1054.
73. Robbins, supra note 71, at 55.
74. Id.; see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
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exhaustion of state judicial remedies, and abuse of the writ of habeas
corpus.75
The crime itself is usually "horrible" with "compelling" evidence
of the defendant's guilt.76 This focuses the attorney's job on the pen-
alty phase and trying to save the client from a death sentence." After
the state demonstrates the "aggravating circumstances that demonstrate
the defendant should forfeit his life, the death penalty attorney must
present evidence to show 'mitigating' circumstances such as the
defendant's personal background, mental capacity and/or character, led
him to commit the crime and therefore the death penalty is inappropri-
ate."78 This phase can be "unbelievably brief,"79 following immedi-
ately at the conclusion of the guilt phase, with "no opening statements,
no cross-examination and ... no witnesses."8  However, the penalty
phase is vitally important for the death capital defendant, since almost
any aspect of a defendant's character, background, life, or personal
history may be used in mitigation of imposing the death penalty.8
Counsel must be prepared to defend the death penalty client at this
juncture. Although counsel may not be able to prove innocence in the
trial phase, it may be possible to literally save the client's life in the
penalty phase. However, if counsel is untrained or unprepared for this
type of litigation, the death penalty phase serves no function and a
sentence of death is the inevitable outcome.
The unique procedures for the imposition of this punishment de-
mand that attorneys with special training handle them. The complexity
and stakes involved in death penalty litigation make it beyond the
capacity of even the most well-meaning of attorneys to undertake. As
death penalty veteran litigator Millard Farmer, Jr. noted, "[ilt's not that
75. Robbins, supra note 71, at 55.
76. Coyle et al., supra note 57, at 30.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 31.
79. Id. The National Law Journal authors found that death penalty trials may take as
little as one to two days, or up to two weeks to two months with "sophisticated indigent
defense systems," followed by a penalty phase that may take only several hours, and in one
case only 15 minutes. Id.
80. Id.
81. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); McAllister, supra note 5, at 1057-58.
[Vol. 98:863
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the lawyer gets into trial and offers less skill than he is capable of
giving. But it would be just like appointing me to play for the Chicago
Bulls - it's beyond my capability."82
The states recognize the need for such specialization and training
and maintain well-funded units with decently compensated attorneys
who know the death penalty system and learn to handle the complexi-
ties of the trials and post-conviction appeals; however, all of these
attorneys are the state's prosecutors.83 Most states do little or nothing
to ensure that those who take on death penalty representation are up to
the task, have the resources to mount a defense, or are properly com-
pensated for their efforts. The state's efforts are reflected in death
penalty counsel's performance.
B. The Nature of Death Penalty Crimes often Leads to Unwarranted
Outcomes
The crimes involved in death penalty trials are heinous, gruesome
offenses against humanity. In one observation of death penalty litiga-
tion before the Supreme Court, it was noted:
One of the most striking impressions is the utter savagery of the
crimes involved . . . . Some of the truly gruesome crimes stand out. [T]he
Texas convict. .. [who] was convicted of brutally raping and murdering
a young housewife .... [A] gash was found in the victim's stomach, and
there were allegations that the assailant's penis had been inserted into the
wound. A Georgia convict had killed his homosexual lover by jamming a
screw driver into his ear and twisting it; he then tried to dispose of the
body by dismembering it and flushing it down the garbage disposal.
Just as terrifying are the routine acts of violence - the mindless
shootings of clerks in convenience stores, or the aimless beatings and
killings of feeble old ladies . . . In one case . . . two young Georgians
robbed a cabdriver. They stripped [him] at knife point and put him the
trunk, laughed as he pleaded for mercy, and eventually drove the car into
a pond.
82. Coyle et al., supra note 57, at 30.
83. Stephen B. Bright Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not For The Worst
Crime But For The Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1844-45 (1994).
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[T]here rarely seemed to be any doubt about whether the defendant
had committed the crime for which he had been sentenced to death. 4
The sheer depravity of the crimes makes the outcome of the trials
almost predictable. The violent nature and sensational circumstances
guarantee community pressure that the assailants be punished and the
sense of outrage be satiated. When a minority defendant may not be
viewed as a member of the community, or when the victim is white
and may be viewed more as one of the community, the sense of com-
munity outrage is heightened. In these circumstances the death penalty
essentially becomes the punishment of choice.
Nonetheless, the defendant is still guaranteed a fair and impartial
trial.8 5 The defendant still has the protections of the Constitution and
is considered innocent until the government proves his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.86 Competent, aggressive representation can spare a
defendant the death penalty by focusing the court and jury on relevant
issues and defusing the inflammatory aspects of the trial. However,
without competent knowledgeable counsel, the urgency and notoriety of
a death penalty trial often leads to a verdict that is not supported by
the evidence.
Certainly, the prospect that an individual may die for a crime that
he or she did not commit should heighten the desire for effective rep-
resentation in death penalty cases. A society should strive to ensure
that when the death penalty is implemented, the courts have gotten it
right. In fact, people have been sentenced to death by our justice sys-
tem for crimes they have not committed.
There have been forty-eight people released from death row since
1970 with significant evidence of their innocence. 7 Forty-three in-
mates were released from death row between 1973 and 1993 who were
84. Clifford Sloan, High Court's Handling of Death Cases, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REP., Mar. 25, 1987, at 2. Mr. Sloan served as a law clerk to the Honorable John Paul
Stevens in 1985 and 1986.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
86. U.S. CONsT. amends. V, VI.
87. HOUSE SuBcoMM. ON CIvIL & CoNsT. RIGHTS COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Inno-
cence and the Death Penalty: Assessing the Danger of Mistaken Executions, at 2-8, October
21, 1993 [hereinafter Innocence].
[Vol. 98:863
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subsequently acquitted, pardoned or had their charges dropped by the
government.8 Since 1900, twenty-three people have been executed in
this country who were demonstrated to be innocent of the crimes for
which they were convicted after their executions. 9 The over-represen-
tation of minorities on death row today has to make society pause and
wonder if race is a deciding factor in a defendant's sentence of death.
Further, evidence of an innocent being sentenced to death raises the
question of what defense counsel was doing during trial. As the O.J.
Simpson and Susan Smith cases have recently taught us, the effective
attorney can spare a defendant from a sentence of death. However, too
often, it is the indigent death penalty defendant who is provided the
ineffective attorney.
C. Death Penalty Trial Counsel are often Ineffective
The quality of representation of a capital defendant can be the
determining factor whether there is a fair outcome in a death penalty
case. Justice Thurgood Marshall made the following comments in 1985,
when discussing the importance of effective, knowledgeable counsel in
death penalty representation:
[T]he unique finality of a capital sentence obliges society to assure that
capital defendants receive a fair chance to present all available defenses,
and that they have at least the same opportunities for acquittal as
noncapital defendants.
The system now in place, however, at times affords capital defen-
dants a lesser opportunity to present their cases than virtually any other
litigant.
[Capital defendants frequently suffer the consequences of having trial
counsel who are ill-equipped to handle capital cases. Death penalty litiga-
tion has become a specialized field of practice, and expensive. And even
the most well-intentioned attorneys often are unable to recognize, preserve
and defend their clients' rights. Often trial counsel simply are unfamiliar
with the special rules that apply in capital cases.
88. Linda Monk, Executing the Guilty Costs Too Much, BALTIMORE SUN, November 9,
1993, at I IA.
89. FAcTs ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 33, at 4 (citing RADELET &
BEDAU, IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE (1992)).
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Counsel, whether appointed or retained, often are handling their first
criminal cases, or their first murder cases. When confronted with this, the
prospect of a death penalty is ominous.
Though acting in good faith, they often make serious mistakes. Thus,
in capital cases ...counsel have simply been unaware that certain death
penalty issues are pending before the appellate courts and that the claims
should be preserved; that certain findings by a jury might preclude imposi-
tion of a death penalty; or that a separate sentencing procedure or phases
of the litigation must follow a conviction. The federal reports are filled
with stories of counsel who presented no evidence in mitigation of their
clients' sentences, simply because they did not know what to offer or how
to offer it, or had not read the state sentencing statute ....
[C]apital trials are often defended by relatively young and inexperienced
attorneys, without investigative sources and with no real expectation that
the defendant may actually face execution.
Trial counsel's lack of expertise takes a heavy toll. A capital defen-
dant seeking postconviction relief is, today, caught up in an increasing
pernicious visegrip. Pressing against him from one side is the Supreme
Court's continual restriction of what Federal Courts can remedy on
postconviction review ....
Pressing against the capital defendant from the other side is the Su-
preme Court's restrictive definition of what constitutes unconstitutional
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial . . . .The Court has not yet rec-
ognized that the right of effective assistance must encompass a right to
counsel familiar with death penalty jurisprudence at the trial stage. Instead,
in all but the most egregious case, a court cannot or will not make a
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel has met what
the Supreme Court has defined as a minimal standard of competence for
criminal lawyers.
As a consequence, many capital defendants find that errors by their
lawyers preclude presentation of substantial constitutional claims, but that
such errors - with the resulting forfeitures of rights - are not enough in
themselves to constitute ineffective assistance.
To quote a recent commentary, "There is little the experienced law-
yer can do but regret the failure to preserve rights and to go through the
paces of yet another futile round of litigation. 90
Justice Marshall's observations have been proven all too true.91
90. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Address Before the Annual Judicial Conference Second
Judicial Circuit of the United States (Sept. 6, 1985), in 109 F.R.D. 441, 443-45 (1985).
91. In a capital murder trial in Alabama in November of 1987, James W. Smith was
[Vol. 98:863
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The episodes of inexperienced and unqualified counsel standing be-
tween a defendant and execution are legion. In addition, the trials are
ordinarily sensational because of the nature of the crime, bringing the
spotlight of publicity to the calculus of a complex case and a charged
courtroom.92 In this mix, attorneys without the skills to handle the
trial leave their clients defenseless and the imposition of the death
penalty becomes almost inevitable. Unfortunately, examples abound.
"PLEASE HELP. DESPERATE."
Although this might be an appropriate cry for a death row defen-
dant, this plea came from Judge Raymond E. Lape, Jr. in a notice he
posted in the Kenton County, Kentucky courthouse in 1988.' 3 Judge
Lape was looking for an attorney to handle the abduction/murder/rape
death penalty trial of defendant Gregory Wilson.9 The court was au-
thorized to pay only $1,250 for the trial and had difficulty attracting
attorneys for the effort.95 Attorney William Hagedorn stepped forward
to represent Wilson.96 He was a lawyer without an active practice,
without training in death penalty cases,97 and with a reputation for
found guilty of murder. The judge asked his counsel, Thomas E. Jones, and the prosecutor
if they were ready to proceed immediately to the guilt phase of the trial. Jones indicated
they were not, stating he had not read the death penalty statute, because he had been work-
ing on the case over the last two weeks. Jones represented to the court that he had been
denied his motions to continue. The judge expressed reluctance to send the jury back to a
motel for another night, but recessed at 7:00 p.m. to resume at 8:30 a.m. Smith is now on
death row. Coyle et al., supra note 57, at 36.
92. In Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (lth Cir. 1985), the Eleventh Circuit out-
lined the prejudicial pretrial publicity that preceded the sensational death penalty trial of four
defendants charged with killing a family in a small, rural Georgia town. In one newspaper
account it stated, "[a]pparently none of the eight lawyers named want the job, but under the
law in such cases, the judge must appoint defenders for the accused, and there are stiff and
severe penalties for attorneys who refuse." Id. at 1494. One court-appointed attorney was
quoted as stating that "It]his is the worst thing that's ever happened to me professional-
ly . . . ." Id. at 1503. One attorney was quoted in an article as stating that the appointment
would cost him "money and friends." Id. at 1504. In another part of the of the relentless
pretrial coverage an attorney was quoted by a paper on his appointment as stating "I've
done everything I can to get out of it. It's worse than a dose of Colomel [a laxative] but I
have to take it." Id. at 1522.




97. The appeal record in the case indicated that Hagedom had previously tried fifteen
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unethical conduct.9 Hagedorn had stolen property recovered in his
law office, appeared in court drunk, and had been held in contempt for
missing a court hearing.99 However, since the court was "desperate,"
Hagedom was appointed.' Wilson was convicted and sentenced to
die in the state's electric chair.''
Black defendant Aden Harrison, Jr. was tried for murder and faced
the death penalty in Atlanta, Georgia in 1986.2 Harrison's lawyer,
83-year-old James Venable, "slept a 'good deal' of the time" according
to the trial judge.' °3 What Harrison did not know at the time was that
Venable had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan since 1923, and was
a former imperial wizard of the racist hate group.'0 4 Another lawyer,
William Sykes, Jr., appointed to "assist" Venable because of Venable's
"reputation, advanced age, and numerous lapses of memory and judg-
ment,"' °5 unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw from the case because
"he sensed serious problems with Venable's representation" of Harri-
son. 0 6 On the first day of the trial in 1984, Sykes learned that he
would be giving the opening statement and trying the case "virtually
on his own."' 7 It was Sykes' first death penalty case - Harrison
was convicted and sentenced to death. 8 Venable later surrendered his
law license after the state began disbarment proceedings, and Harrison
was eventually gTanted a new trial."9 While Harrison's case may be
extreme, such incompetence is not unusual."0
murder cases. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 836 S.W.2d 872, 878 (Ky. 1992).
98. Saul, supra note 57, at 4.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Wilson, 836 S.W.2d at 876.
102. Paul Marcotte, Snoozing, Unprepared Lawyer Cited: Habeus Granted in Two Death





107. Marcotte, supra note 102, at 14.
108. Id.; Harrison v. State, 361 S.E.2d 149 (Ga. 1987).
109. Id.
110. There are enlightening examples in WITH JUSTICE FOR FEW, supra note 69, and
Bright, supra note 83.
[Vol. 98:863
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During the 1982 murder trial of Jerry White in Orlando, Florida,
the judge called counsel to his chambers daily and had the state's trial
prosecutor monitor defense attorney Emmett Moran's breath for signs
of alcohol usage."' The prosecutor, in a post-conviction affidavit,
stated that Moran appeared confused and fatigued during the trial, was
frequently late for proceedings, even though the court accommodated
him with late starting times, and frequently complained about not feel-
ing well and being fatigued, particularly in the afternoon."' Moran's
investigator stated in a post-conviction affidavit that Moran would
shoot up cocaine during the trial recesses, and would use speed, alco-
hol, Quaaludes, morphine and marijuana after trial."' Moran admitted
being so tired and overwhelmed at trial that he was unable to make
use of his client's extremely low IQ test scores as a mitigating factor
against implementation of the death penalty."' Moran's health prob-
lems affecting his trial judgment were not enough to declare him inef-
fective." 5 White sits on death row today.
Judy Haney, on trial for the contract murder of her husband in
1989, was provided a court-appointed attorney who was held in con-
tempt of court and jailed during the trial for appearing at the trial
intoxicated." 6 The counsel also failed to present to the jury hospital
records showing her as a battered spouse - despite being informed by
Haney about them three months prior to the trial."7 These records
may have helped convince the jury that she should be spared the death
penalty.'
s
Jack House stood trial in 1973, facing the death penalty for the
murder of two boys in Atlanta, Georgia. He was represented at trial by
a husband/wife team, Ben and Dorothy Atkins. In the habeus corpus
111. Coyle et at., supra note 57, at 30.
112. White v. State, 664 So. 2d 242, 245-46 n.4 (Fla. 1995) (Ansted, J., Shaw, J., &
Kogan, J., dissenting).
113. Coyle et al., supra note 57, at 30.
114. White, 664 So. 2d at 245-46 n.4.
115. Id. at 244.
116. Haney v. State, 603 So. 2d 368 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); WITH JusTIcE FOR FEW,
supra note 69, at 7-8.
117. Haney, 603 So. 2d at 377.
118. WITH JUSTICE FOR FEW, supra note 69, at 8.
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petition reviewed by the Eleventh Circuit after House's conviction, the
court found Ben and Dorothy Atkins sought no discovery from the
prosecution or police. They did not know of any blood spot evidence
until the trial. When the state presented evidence showing blood found
on House's pants was the same type as one of the victims, the two
defense counsel were unable to present evidence showing that the
blood was also the same type as House's wife." 9
The failure of defense counsel to obtain rudimentary discovery is
even more incredible upon learning the reasons behind this failure:
Dorothy Atkins stated that she was "too busy"'2 and barely spoke to
their client.'2' The attorneys also were unaware of a court-ordered
pretrial psychiatric examination that showed their client to be schizo-
phrenic.2 2 During the trial, one of the attorneys left the courtroom
during the testimony of a key prosecution witness whom he later cross-
examined.2  Defense counsel even failed to present evidence at the
sentencing phase of the trial because they were unaware of the sentenc-
ing phase, having failed to read the death penalty statute before or
during the trial. 24 After learning of the sentencing phase, counsel
failed to request a continuance. 25 Ben Atkins made a closing argu-
ment consisting of four sentences, making no reference to any mitigat-
ing circumstances or to why the evidence did not support a finding of
aggravating circumstances to support the death penalty.'26
After House was sentenced to death, counsel filed "standard mo-
tions taken from a form book" for a new trial, failing to identify three
witnesses known to the Atkins who had seen the victims after the
state's alleged time of death, which would have provided their client
119. House presented evidence at the trial that he had sexual intercourse with his wife
on the morning that the murder victims' were found, and had kept his pants on during
intercourse. His wife was bleeding from her menstrual cycle at the time. House v. State,
205 S.E.2d 217, 219 (Ga. 1974).
120. House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608, 617 (11th Cir. 1984).
121. WITH JUSTICE FOR FEW, supra note 69, at 8.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 619.
124. Id.; In re Ben S. Atkins, 320 S.E.2d 146 (Ga. 1984).
125. Atkins, 320 S.E.2d at 146.
126. Id. at 14647.
886 [V ol. 98:863
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with an alibi.127 To compound matters, neither of the Atkins appeared
to argue the motion for a new trial. 2' The Eleventh Circuit, in set-
ting the death sentence aside, found that Ben and Dorothy Atkins,
representing a man on trial for his life, "qualified only as spectators,"
based on their woefully inadequate preparation.129 In ordering Ben
Atkins disbarred, the Georgia Supreme Court noted that Ben Atkins'
representation of House was "the functional equivalent in every respect
of having no representation at all."'3 ° The Atkins' representation of
House was found to be constitutionally ineffective. 3'
Gary Nelson was placed on trial in 1980 for the 1978 murder of
an eight-year-old girl and faced the death penalty.' His attorney at
trial was a sole practitioner who had never before tried a death penalty
case.' Nelson's attorney was paid "between $15 and $20 per hour,"
was denied a request for co-counsel as well as funds for an investiga-
tor, and failed to request funds for an expert witness.'34 The
attorney's closing argument on behalf of a man facing death consisted
of 225 words.'35 Nelson's appeal of his death sentence conviction was
taken over by a private law firm and he was eventually cleared of all
charges and released. 3 ' Although his trial counsel was eventually dis-
barred,'37 Nelson spent eleven years on Georgia's death row. 
13 8
The trials of John Eldon Smith'39 and his wife, Rebecca Akins
Machetti, 4 ° poignantly demonstrate the cruel arbitrariness of the death
penalty and the profound impact of inexperienced counsel on death
127. House, 725 F.2d at 613; WITH JUSTICE FOR FEW, supra note 69, at 8.
128. House, 725 F.2d at 613.
129. Id. at 619.
130. Atkins, 320 S.E.2d at 147 (quoting House v. Balkcom, 562 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D.
Ga. 1983)).
131. House, 725 F.2d at 619.
132. WITH JUSTICE FOR FEW, supra note 69, at 8.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 8-9.
135. Id. at 9.
136. Id.; Nelson v. Zant, 405 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. 1991).
137. Nelson, 405 S.E.2d at 253 n.3.
138. WITH JUSTICE FOR FEW, supra note 69, at 8-9.
139. Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir. 1983).
140. Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1982).
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penalty litigation. Smith and Machetti were convicted and sentenced to
death for the 1974 shotgun shootings of Machetti's former husband and
his wife in Bibb County, Georgia. 4' The two defendants were tried
in separate trials, starting within weeks of one another in the same
county; however, both trials were heard by juries with the same consti-
tutionally impermissible flaw.142 Both defendants were convicted and
received the death penalty, but only Machetti's counsel challenged the
jury composition. Smith's attorneys "were unaware of a United States
Supreme Court decision decided only five days before Smith's trial
began" on the issue.'43 Machetti was successful in her habeus corpus
petition to the Eleventh Circuit and received a new trial.' In her re-
trial, with a constitutionally permissible jury, she received a sentence of
life imprisonment. 45 Smith's attorneys failed to preserve the identical
issue and the Eleventh Circuit declined to consider it in his habeas
corpus petition.'46 Smith was executed, although not "the mastermind
in this murder."' 147 The two defendants conspired and committed the
same crime; yet, because of the difference in the competence of coun-
sel for each, one was executed, while the other's life was spared. In
his dissent, Justice Hatchett lamented that "[t]he fairness promised in
Furman v. Georgia . . . has long been forgotten."'48
John Eldon Smith has not been alone in suffering such fatal mis-
takes made by death penalty counsel."' Repeatedly it is the indigent
death penalty defendant who has the worst representation. For instance,
six of the twenty-six defendants on Kentucky's death row in Decem-
ber, 1989, had lawyers who were eventually disbarred or had their
licenses suspended. 5 From the time of Gregg v. Georgia to 1990,
the trial lawyers who represented death row inmates in Alabama, Geor-
141. Id.
142. The Georgia jury selection system systematically excluded women from the grand
juries and trial juries seated in the state. Id. at 237-42; Bright, supra note 83, at 685.
143. Bright, supra note 83, at 685 (footnote omitted); Smith, 715 F.2d at 1471.
144. Machetti, 679 F.2d at 241-42.
145. Id.
146. Smith, 715 F.2d at 1476 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Bright, supra note 83; WITH JUSTICE FOR FEW, supra note 69.
150. Saul, supra note 57, at 8.
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gia, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas were disbarred, suspend-
ed or otherwise disciplined at a rate three to forty six times the disci-
pline rate for attorneys in those states. '
In a survey in 1990, over half of the defense counsel questioned
said that they were handling their first death penalty trials when their
clients were convicted.'52 That same survey, in examining death pen-
alty trials, found that in one quarter of the trials "no effort . . . was
expended to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase."'53 Sur-
veys indicate that federal appellate courts have found constitutional
flaws in 40 percent to 73 percent of the state death penalty cases re-
viewed on the merits.'54 These cases involve not only ineffective as-
sistance of counsel, but also constitutional flaws such as prosecutorial
misconduct and illegally gained confessions,155 which further empha-
size the need for effective defense counsel.
D. Ineffective Counsel are also Found in Post-Conviction Proceedings
Alarmingly, these ineffective practices are found on appeal too.
For example in Morgan v. Zant,5 6 the counsel for a death penalty
defendant filed no notice of appeal after his client's conviction. He
eventually filed a brief after he was threatened with sanctions by the
Georgia Supreme Court; however, that brief contained only five pages
of argument and failed to address the trial court's sentencing charge to
the jury which ultimately led to a new sentencing hearing. Then, he
failed to heed the request of the Georgia Supreme Court to file a sup-
plemental brief on the adequacy of the trial court's penalty charge, and
also failed to attend the oral argument before the Georgia Supreme
Court.'
57
151. Coyle et al., supra note 57, at 30.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. Robbins, supra note 71, at 55 n.113 (citing brief amicus curiae for the
NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)).
155. Id.
156. 743 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1984), overruled by Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 147g.
157. Id. at 780.
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Similarly, the attorney for Larry Heath, also a death penalty defen-
dant, filed a brief with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that
was only six pages long and a brief with the Alabama Supreme Court
which was only one page; each brief contained but one argument.'58
Heath's counsel failed to appear for oral argument in the Alabama
Supreme Court and his briefs were deemed deficient by the Eleventh
Circuit, and would not have been filed by knowledgeable death penalty
litigators.'59 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit found that Heath was
not prejudiced by his appellate counsel. 61 In 1992, Heath was execut-
ed by the state of Alabama.''
The attorneys attracted to state death penalty trial appointments are
also those attracted to handle the post-conviction appeals. Frequently,
the inadequate death penalty trial counsel continues to serve as the
death penalty post-conviction counsel. The defendant then is divested
of what may be his only real post-conviction argument: ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.
E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Wastes Time and Resources
Inadequate practice in death penalty litigation results in unneces-
sary expense and waste of resources. Trials conducted improperly be-
cause of poor and inadequate representation by defense counsel end up
becoming retrials or, a rehearing, as in Morgan v. Zant.'2 Either
way, because of the state's failure to ensure adequate, competent repre-
sentation at the initial trial, it ends up paying for the time of the court,
its personnel, the prosecutor and a different, if not competent, defense
counsel for the second trial or rehearing.
The prosecutor's goal is to do the trial once and do it right, that
is, to make sure a case is tried properly and correctly in the first trial
to eliminate appellate issues that would require the case to be remand-
ed for a retrial or dismissed. This should be the goal of the criminal
158. Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1131 (11th Cir. 1991).
159. Id.; McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2785, 2787 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
160. Heath, 941 F.2d at 1132.
161. McFarland, 114 S. Ct. at 2787.
162. 743 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1984), overruled by Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 147g.
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justice system in general and the death penalty courts in particular.
Ineffective defense counsel defeats this goal. By failing to provide
defense counsel competent for the task of the death penalty trial and/or
post-conviction appeal, the state ensures that the prosecutor is ineffi-
cient and must spend limited resources on one case for multiple trials
and post-conviction appeals. Moreover, the trial judge is unable to
move the case off the court's docket, and the court system, as a result,
bogs down. This inures to the ultimate detriment of the state's taxpay-
ers."'3 Taxpayers pay the bill for the death penalty trial itself, includ-
ing court-appointed defense counsel.'64
Despite the expenditure of taxpayer money in death penalty cases,
it is not always allocated in a manner to ensure that attorneys who are
capable of handling the capital trial are compensated at a rate that
would encourage their participation in the system. It is the lack of
resources and effort to attract competent death penalty trial counsel for
the defense that weakens the system, causing retrials and appellate
delays. Moreover, failing to compensate appointed trial counsel is un-
fair to the individual placed on trial for his life, since he ordinarily
lacks the resources to make sure he is properly defended.
F. With Death Penalty Counsel, You Will often Get What You Pay
for
The low statutory fees offered by states to represent indigent death
penalty cases act as a disincentive to those attorneys who are the most
capable of handling the cases.'65 Counsel are often paid less, if any-
163. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 71, at 70 ("Jurisdictions that do not provide for
more than inadequate defense of at the initial stages of capital litigation are being penny
wise and pound foolish; they will likely pay the price later on in the process, in terms of
both money and time.").
164. See infra notes 331-54 and accompanying text (discussing "The False Economy of
Eliminating the PCDOs").
165. For example, Mississippi has a flat; unwaivable fee cap of $1,000 per death penal-
ty trial. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-15-17 (1994 & Cum. Supp. 1987). This is the equivalent of
about $5 per hour for many lawyers. Coyle et al., supra note 57, at 30. Florida and South
Carolina limit their fees to $3,500, although in South Carolina the attorney may petition the
court to be paid more. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.036(2)(d) (West 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §
17-3-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1993).
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thing at all, for post-conviction representation. 6 6 In the state of Tex-
as, even though fees ranged widely, attorneys' fee requests were fre-
quently cut by the courts.
167
It is difficult to attract the best and the brightest of the legal pro-
fession to a practice that will not compensate for representation of
indigents in one of the most difficult practices in the profession. Judge
Lape, of Kenton County, Kentucky, was provided only $1,250 to pay a
court-appointed attorney to handle the abduction/murder/rape death
penalty trial of defendant Gregory Wilson in 1988.168 This amount
would not properly compensate a conscientious defense counsel. As
discussed above, the attorney who finally stepped forward proved to be
less than adequate for the task. 9
Capital defense attorneys also find that they simply do not have
the investigative and expert support to conduct a proper defense be-
cause the state does not provide the funding that is required. In 1994,
Justice Blackmun noted that:
Although a properly conducted capital trial can involve hundreds of hours
of investigation, preparation, and lengthy trial proceedings, many States
severely limit the compensation paid for capital defense. Louisiana limits
the compensation for court-appointed capital-defense counsel to $1,000 for
all pretrial preparation and trial proceedings. Kentucky pays a maximum of
$2,500 for the same services. Alabama limits reimbursement for out-of-
court preparation in capital cases to a maximum of $1,000 each for the
trial and penalty phases . . . . Court-awarded funds for the appointment of
investigators and experts often are either unavailable, severely limited, or
not provided by state courts. As a result, attorneys appointed to represent
capital defendants at the trial level frequently are unable to recoup even
their overhead costs and out-of-pocket expenses, and effectively may be
required to work at minimum wage or below while funding from their
own pockets their client's defense. A recent survey by the Mississippi
Trial Lawyers' Association estimated that capital-defense attorneys in that
State are compensated at an average rate of $11.75 per hour . . . . Com-
pensation rates of $5 per hour or less are not uncommon . . . . The pros-
166. Robbins, supra note 71, at 77.
167. John B. Arango, Defense Services for the Poor: Post-Conviction Death Penalty
Cases, 9 CIuM. Jus'I. 36 (1994).
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pect that hours spent in trial preparation or funds expended hiring psychia-
trists or ballistics experts will be uncompensated unquestionably chills even
a qualified attorney's zealous representation of his client. 7
The low statutory fees make it unrealistic to believe that the law-
yers who agree to take on a death penalty case will be willing to put
in the time and effort it takes to properly handle a trial. Moreover,
even though investigators and experts are critical to a proper investiga-
tion, the states rarely provide adequate funding to accomplish proper
pretrial and post-conviction investigation.17' Requests for funds for
investigators and experts are frequently denied by courts."' For ex-
ample, Mallory Holloway represented Randall Hafdahl in a death pen-
alty trial in 1985 in Amarillo, Texas.' Judge H. Brian Poff, Jr. ad-
vised Holloway not to move for funds for an investigator since he had
already taxed the county's resources by insisting on co-counsel. 74
Death penalty attorneys frequently have to spend substantial sums
out-of-pocket for expert and investigative services.'75 In a survey of
volunteer attorneys who handle collateral death penalty appeals in
twenty-four states, it was found that they incurred an average of more
than $10,000 in out-of-pocket expenses and spent a median of 665
hours on each case.'76 In Texas, it was found that post-conviction
counsel spend an average of $15,627 per case in out-of-pocket expens-
es, and some counsel spend as much as $70,000 for these services on
a case.' These types of expenditures could severely impair a law
firm, and ruin a solo practitioner. With this sort of commitment of
170. McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2785, 2786 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions and footnotes omitted). The opinion cites ALA. CODE § 15-12-21(a) (Supp. 1992); 222
Op. Ala. Att'y Gen. No. 91-00206 (Mar. 21, 1991).
171. Id. at 2572.
172. Coyle et al., supra note 57, at 30.
173. Marianne Lavelle, Fatal Defense: Strong Law Thwarts Lone Star Counsel, 12
NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 34.
174. Id.
175. Robert L. Spangenberg & Tessa J. Schwartz, The Indigent Defense Crisis is
Chronic: Balanced Allocation of Resources Is Needed To End The Constitutional Crisis, 9
C~iM. JUST. 13, 15 (1994).
176. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup: Right to Death-Row Lawyer Curbed,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1989, at 8.
177. Id.
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time and expense for appellate death penalty work, it is difficult to
find attorneys willing to jump into the fray.'78 Needless to say, it
hardly works to attract the best of the bar to the practice.
G. States Lack Effective Minimum Standards to Ensure Representation
by Qualified Counsel
Most states have such minimum standards for attorneys to meet to
be appointed to death penalty cases that unskilled counsel are appoint-
ed. James Bell of Jackson, Mississippi, indicated, "I got on the [capital
appointment] list my second year out of [law] school because I won
some tough cases and [got] some respect. Well, my client got execut-
ed. I specialized in criminal defense, but I'll tell you what: this is not
criminal defense." '79
In Alabama, appointed counsel is required to have five years ac-
tive criminal practice. 8' However, such a standard does little to en-
sure competency in a state with many rural areas where criminal court
meets infrequently and criminal dockets are dominated by misdemean-
ors. 8' In Louisiana, the court need only appoint an attorney who has
been a member of the bar for five years, without regard to criminal
experience;'82 the court may appoint someone with "less experience"
as assistant counsel.183 The states of Texas, Mississippi and Florida
have no state-wide standards, while Georgia's standards are unenforced
by the courts. 84
In 1981, before an all-white jury in Mississippi, Bobby Caldwell, a
black defendant, faced the death penalty for the robbery and murder of
178. Some courts have struck down fee caps and low fees for capital defense work,
allowing attorneys to collect higher fees than those set by the state. See Marcia Coyle et al.,
Efforts in the Death Belt to Bolster Indigent Defense Yield Mixed Results - But There Are
A Few Hopeful Developments, 13 NAT'L L.J., November 19, 1990, at 1.
179. Coyle et al., supra note 57, at 30.
180. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-54 (1975).
181. Coyle et al., supra note 57, at 30.
182. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 512 (West 1996).
183. Id.
184. Coyle et al., supra note 57, at 30.
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a white shopkeeper.185 At trial, his counsel, a civil attorney,186 deliv-
ered an opening statement that required only one page of trial tran-
script. 87 Counsel's closing argument for the trial, just before the jury
was to deliberate on Caldwell's guilt, consisted of only two pages.'88
Caldwell was found guilty and sentenced to death.'89 The Mississippi
Supreme Court rejected Caldwell's argument that he was denied effec-
tive assistance of counsel, opining that evidence of his guilt was so
overwhelming, it would have done counsel little good to protest
Caldwell's innocence.'9" However, prosecutorial misconduct in the ar-
guments provided Caldwell with a new trial.19" ' Counsel's lack of
criminal experience was overcome by the state's overreaching.
The Supreme Court has observed that in many instances, the
states' standards for death penalty attorneys provide no assurances that
those who come forward are any more than "a person who happens to
185. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
186. Coyle et al., supra note 57, at 30.
187. "As [the prosecutor] told you, there's a lot of proof in this case . . . . If the
proof shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Bobby Caldwell did on the 29th of October,
1980, kill a lady by the name of Elizabeth Faulkner . . . it is going to be your duty to
return a verdict of guilty." Coyle, Fatal Defense, Scant Search for the Truth, supra note 57,
at 30, col.2.
188. In closing, Caldwell's attorney stated:
[W]e knew of the abundance of evidence that would be presented here today that
would point toward the ultimate guilt of Mr. Caldwell . . . I have thought, have
searched my mind . . . as to what defense that we could possibly make in the
face of all the evidence that was surely to be produced here in this Courthouse.
Now, we feel that we have made the State of Mississippi perform its duty. You
have within your discretion to bring in at least one of three verdicts. One - that
of capital murder, and if that is done and that is your decision, we will go into
another phase of this trial . . . a verdict of murder and, of course, a verdict of
not guilty. I don't know of anything I could say further for, and on behalf of,
Bobby Caldwell."
Id.
189. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 443 So. 2d 806 (Miss. 1983).
190. Caldwell v. State, 481 So. 2d 850, 852 (Miss. 1985).
191. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
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be a lawyer."'92 It is troubling that the Court then did little to ensure
adequate representation of death penalty defendants.
H. Strickland v. Washington Provides No Protection from Ineffective-
ness
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that to show
ineffective assistance of counsel the defendant has to demonstrate "that
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness," 193 and show prejudice that "so undermined the proper function-
ing of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as hav-
ing produced a just result."'94 The unjust result is shown by "a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different."'95 Trial counsel is given a wide
range of tactics to effectively represent a criminal defendant and there
is a strong presumption that the tactics employed were effective for
Sixth Amendment purposes. 96
A former clerk to Justice Stevens noted that:
Whether somebody received the death penalty very often seemed to
be a function of the quality of their lawyers .... [B]y and large the
people who receive the death penalty are dirt poor. They are represented
by overburdened public defenders or by court appointed counsel who fre-
quently seem to lack much zest for the job.'97
192. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). Some states, notably Ohio
and California, have made great strides to ensure that death penalty counsel are properly
trained and compensated. See Coyle, supra note 57, at 30; Stephen Magagnini, Closing
Death Row Would Save State $90 Million A Year, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 28, 1988, at
Al.
193. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
194. ld. at 686.
195. Id. at 694.
196. Id. at 689.
197. Sloan, supra note 83 at 3. One death penalty counsel lacked such "zeal" for his
duty that he gave a closing argument that was termed "an apology for having served as
[defendant's] counsel." The defendant was granted a new trial because of counsel's ineffec-
tiveness, the court holding that counsel's argument that the defendant's life would be spared
if the jury felt sympathy for the attorney should be rejected. Mathis v. Zant, 704 F. Supp.
1062, 1064 (N.D. Ga. 1989). In another case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held "it
may have been difficult for the jury to realize whose side defense counsel were on when
[Vol. 98:863
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Despite these poor efforts of representation, Strickland v. Washington
has not provided death penalty defendants relief from this generally
inadequate representation by counsel.198
A number of cases in this article vividly demonstrates the inade-
quacy of Strickland v. Washington. For example, Larry Heath's
counsel's failure to raise more than one issue on appeal of Heath's
death penalty conviction in Alabama, and his counsel's filing of six-
page and one-page appellate briefs, along with his failure to appear for
oral argument in the Alabama Supreme Court, were deemed "defi-
cient," but did not violate the standards of Strickland v. Washing-
ton."'99 Orlando counsel Emmett Moran's daily intoxication in Jerry
White's 1982 murder trial was also permitted under the Supreme
Court's standards for effective assistance of counsel.00
Gregory Wilson's representation in his death penalty trial in
Kenton County, Kentucky, despite his counsel having no active prac-
tice, no training in death penalty cases, and a reputation for unethical
conduct, was found to be effective under the standards of Strickland v.
Washington. °1 Indeed, the court found that there was no basis to find
that death penalty cases were so different as to constitute an entirely
different area of expertise, and rejected Wilson's argument that an in-
tense background inquiry should have been performed to determine his
they continued to refer to applicant as a 'wetback,' not only during voir dire when this
arguably had some strategic value, but also during final argument on both guilt and punish-
ment . . . ." Ex parte Guzmon, 730 S.W.2d 724, 733 (Tex. Crim. 1987). Black defendant
Wilbur Dobbs was defended in his capital murder trial by a white defense attorney who
stated, in describing his "outspoken" views on blacks, that many blacks "are uneducated and
would not make good teachers," that blacks are "less intelligent than whites" by nature, and
that his "granddaddy had slaves." Id. He also stated his belief that "integration has led to
the deterioration of neighborhoods and schools," referred to a particular black community as
"black boy jungle," and claimed that blacks from this neighborhood were "more trouble-
some" than blacks in a nearby county. Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1577 (N.D. Ga.
1989), rev'd 506 U.S. 357 (1993) (habeas corpus petition based on racially bias trial de-
nied).
198. Robbins, supra note 71, at 67.
199. Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir. 1991).
200. White v. State, 664 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1995).
201. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 836 S.W.2d 872, 878-80 (Ky. 1992).
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counsel's qualifications to try a death penalty case as a practice that
would discourage the private bar from accepting appointments to repre-
sent death penalty defendants." 2 With this decision, the Kentucky
court has, in essence, acknowledged that it will appoint to handle a
death penalty case whoever walks in the courthouse door with a license
to practice law, whether qualified or not.
Jerry White's trial counsel was not found ineffective despite his
intoxication and unprofessional conduct during the trial. °3 Judy
Haney's counsel in her death penalty trial in Alabama was found to be
effective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington although
counsel was incarcerated during the trial for contempt for his intoxica-
tion and failed to introduce critical documents into evidence that were
known to him three months prior to the trial."4 Gary Nelson's coun-
sel accepted the appointment of representing Nelson even though he
had never handled a death penalty case before." 5 He was having fi-
nancial difficulties, and was paid between 15 dollars and 20 dollars per
hour, well below an attorney's normal fee by the state.2"6 Nelson's
counsel was refused assistance by the state and eventually turned in a
performance worthy of his fee.2"7 Despite these factors, the courts
never addressed the issue of the constitutional adequacy of counsel's
performance." 8 John Eldon Smith's trial counsel made a mistake that
literally cost Smith his life: failing to preserve an issue that allowed
his co-defendant to gain a new trial and a life sentence. However, his
counsel's performance was never evaluated by the court and thus was
deemed constitutionally adequate.
Alden Harrison's family learned, in hiring James Venable for
Harrison's 1986 death penalty trial, that low fees will often guarantee a
concomitant level of effort. Harrison, even though his family had some
money to devote to his defense, was attracted to Venable because of
202. Id. at 880.
203. White, 664 So. 2d at 242.
204. Haney v. State, 603 So. 2d 368, 375-78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
205. WITH JUSTICE FOR FEW, supra note 69, at 8.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Nelson v. Zant, 405 S.E.2d 250, 250 (Ga. 1991).
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his low fees.2"9 Venable turned in a performance equivalent to his
low fees, earning Harrison a death sentence. Venable was found to be
ineffective at trial.210 However, it was just the third finding of inef-
fective assistance of counsel by a Georgia state court under Strickland
v. Washington.2 ' Death row inmates are attracted to counsel who will
not entirely deplete their family funds. Yet, those attorneys who charge
low fees or will accept an appointment for low statutory fees are fre-
quently unqualified to do the work.
Frederico Martinez-Macias was convicted in Texas of capital mur-
der in June of 1984.212 Two days before his scheduled execution,
Macias received a stay of execution, and then the law firm of Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom of Washington, D.C., assisted by the
Texas PCDO, entered his case.2"3 In 1991, his conviction was over-
turned because his court-appointed trial counsel was shown to be con-
stitutionally ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washing-
ton.214 His counsel failed to conduct even a cursory investigation, did
not call witnesses who could have refuted the prosecution's case, and
missed considerable evidence pointing to Macias' innocence.215 In af-
firnming the District Court's decision to grant Macias' writ of habeas
corpus for ineffective assistance of counsel and free him from death
row, the Fifth Circuit found that "actual innocence was a close ques-
tion" and "[t]he state paid defense counsel $11.84 per hour. Unfortu-
nately, the justice system only got what it paid for." '216 Following this
decision, a grand jury, provided with the evidence developed by the
PCDO-aided counsel, refused to indict Macias, and he was freed.217
Jon Wood of San Antonio, Texas represented Jesus Romero in a
death penalty trial in 1985.218 After Romero was found guilty of mur-
209. Marcotte, supra note 102, at 14.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Innocence, supra note 87, at 10.
213. Id.
214. Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 810 F. Supp. 782 (W.D. Tex. 1991).
215. Innocence, supra note 87, at 10.
216. Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067, 1067 (5th Cir. 1992).
217. Innocence, supra note 87, at 10.
218. Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1989).
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der, at the penalty phase of the trial, Wood offered the following clos-
ing argument:
[Wood]: Ladies and Gentlemen, I appreciate the time you took deliberating
[during the guilt phase of the trial] and the thought you put into this. I'm
going to be extremely brief. I have a reputation for not being brief. Jesse,
stand up. Jesse?
[Romero]: Sir?
[Wood]: Stand up. You are an extremely intelligent jury. You've got that
man's life in your hands. You can take it or not. That's all I have to
say 219
The Fifth Circuit, noting that Wood had presented no evidence in the
penalty phase of the trial, but had presented some mitigating factors in
the guilt phase: of the trial, held that "[h]ad the jury returned a life
sentence the strategy might well have been seen as a brilliant
move."'22 Romero was found to have effective assistance of coun-
sel22' and was executed in 1992.222 Wood was suspended from the
practice of law in 1993 for reasons unrelated to Romero's trial.223
From 1984 when Strickland v. Washington was handed down to
1990, the Florida Supreme Court found ineffective assistance of coun-
sel only nine times, Mississippi's Supreme Court twice, the Supreme
Courts of Alabama, Louisiana and Georgia once each, while the Su-
preme Court of Texas never made a finding of ineffective assistance of
counsel.24 "[Tihe standard [for effective assistance of counsel] has
come down, down, down to meet these people.
'225
219. Id.
220. Id. at 877.
221. Id. at 879.
222. Christopher Hanson, Death Row Will Speed Up, but Injustices May, Too: Federal
Court's Ability to Review Convict's Legal Representation Has Been Restricted, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Nov. 19, 1995, at 14A.
223. Disciplinary Actions (Suspensions), 56 TEX. B.J., Jan. 1993, at 73.
224. Coyle et al., supra note 57, at 42.
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I Habeas Corpus Representation is a Guaranteed Right but Difficult
to Provide
The death row prison population in this country is growing at a
rapid rate, thus the need for competent post-conviction representation is
growing. These inmates are usually indigent, thus the government must
find and pay counsel to assist them. In 1981, there were 848 death
row inmates in the United States.226 By 1988, the number of death
row prisoners had grown to 2,151,227 and by 1994 there were 2,976
death row inmates sitting in state and federal cells. 228 The death row
population is now over 3,000 individuals. Each of these death row
inmates have the right to a direct appeal of their cases within the state
judicial system, and state post-conviction or collateral review following
their direct appeal.229 However, the right to court-appointed counsel is
only constitutionally required for the trial and direct appellate re-
view.23' There is a gap for the state post-conviction collateral review
where counsel need not be provided by the government.
The present system of review is a "multi-layered state and federal
appeal and collateral review. ' Following the exhaustion of the state
appeals,2 32 the death row inmate has the right to seek review in the
federal district court in the jurisdiction of the convicting authority to
determine if the conviction or the death sentence itself violates the
United States Constitution or federal law.233 The review system is
"piecemeal" with "repetitious litigation" and years of delay between the
trial and the appellate resolution.2 4 The inapplicability of res judicata
226. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 1
(1981).
227. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATON FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 1
(1988).
228. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 1
(1994).
229. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 166-67, 204-06 (1976); REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE SUBCOMMITrEE ON DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION 1-2 [hereinafter DEFEND-
ER SERVICES REPORT].
230. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
231. THE POWELL REPORT, supra note 3, at 1.
232. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1994).
233. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994).
234. By 1989, the shortest time between trial and appellate conclusion had been 2 years
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allows the inmates to petition federal courts two, three and four times
for relief, and the present rules allow for at least three original peti-
tions: after state direct review, after state collateral proceedings, and
after federal collateral proceedings, to the United States Supreme
Court.
235
The focus of death penalty appellate review is usually on collateral
matters, since the inmates' guilt is usually sufficiently established, and
their petitions debate the constitutional adequacy of their trials or the
appropriateness of their death sentences, thus "the lack of adequate
counsel creates severe problems. 2 36 Pro se the death row inmates,
unable to afford attorneys to help them through the morass of the
review process, can do themselves harm.
Capital inmates almost uniformly are indigent, and often illiterate and
uneducated. Capital habeas litigation may be difficult and complex. Pris-
oners acting pro se rarely present promptly or properly exhaust their con-
stitutional challenges in the state forum. This results in delayed or ineffec-
tive federal collateral procedures. The end result is often appointment of
qualified counsel only when execution is imminent. But at this stage, seri-
ous constitutional claims may have been waived. The belated entry of a
lawyer, under severe time pressure, does not do enough to ensure fair-
ness.
237
Because the nature of the appellate reviews often involve hearings in
federal court and this jurisprudence can be "complex" and rapidly
changing,2 3 "the 'learning curve' for attorneys unfamiliar with this
field of law increases the cost of counsel. When attorneys decline to
accept more than one capital case, the cost of the 'learning curve' is
multiplied because the proverbial wheel is constantly re-invented. 239
Frequently the attorney who handles this post-conviction litigation is
the same attorney who mishandled the trial or is a new attorney with
little experience to handle the applicable body of law and proce-
and nine months, while the longest time was 14 years and six months, with an average time
of 8 years and six months. THE POWELL REPORT, supra note 3, at 1.
235. Id. at 3.
236. Id. at 4.
237. Id.
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dure.24° Thus, the result is often no more effective than that of the
pro se death row inmate's.
The 3,046 death row inmates who are known today24' are enti-
tled to representation in a federal habeas corpus appeal.242 Although
the growing number of inmates makes adequate representation difficult
to find, the federal government is mandated to provide such representa-
tion. Moreover, competent representation is "necessary to a fair and
orderly review.
243
Federal courts have three options in meeting the obligations man-
dated by statute. First, the courts may appoint attorneys from the pri-
vate bar. These attorneys submit vouchers and are paid by the Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts from funds provided pursu-
ant to the Criminal Justice Act. 44 These attorneys are compensated at
rates that are determined by the courts to be reasonably necessary to
obtain qualified counsel, with no set rate in death penalty cases.245
As a second option, the courts may appoint federal public defender
organizations. These organizations are funded through grants approved
by the Judicial Conference of the United States.246 Although twelve
federal public defenders have represented twenty-two death-sentenced
inmates since 1977, their primary mission is to represent criminal de-
fendants in federal courts, not death row petitioners in habeas corpus
appeals.247 These first two options do not offer representation in death
penalty cases and post-conviction appeals of those cases as a specialty.
240. Robbins, supra note 71, at 71.
241. 1995 DEATH RoW, U.S.A., supra note 28, at 2.
242. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4) (1994).
243. DEFENDER SERVICES REPORT, supra note 229, at 5.
244. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1994).
245. VII GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 2.22 (discussing appoint-
ment of counsel in criminal cases); 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(10) (1994).
246. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(2)(A)(1994); 28 U.S.C. § 605 (1994).
247. DEFENDER SERVICES REPORT, supra note 229, at 3-4.
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IV. PCDOs AS A SOLUTION
The third method of providing counsel available to the federal
courts is by the Post-Conviction Defender Organizations. These organi-
zations deal only with death penalty cases and related post-conviction
matters. PCDOs employ full-time, salaried attorneys, investigators and
support staff in twenty of the thirty-eight states that have the death
penalty.248 The PCDOs receive grants from the Judicial Confer-
ence 249 that are contingent upon each PCDO receiving state funds to
support the state court work that it intends to perform. 50 In fiscal
year 1994, the twenty PCDOs received a total of $19,589,740 for their
capital defense work. 1 The primary function of PCDOs are to re-
cruit and train private attorneys to represent death row inmates, to
serve as consultants to these attorneys and to provide expertise in death
row litigation.5
The training provided by PCDOs is pivotal to effective and cost-
efficient representation of death row inmates.
When the same attorney represents the inmate in both state and federal
post-conviction proceedings, both time and money is [sic] saved. Assuming
that the state system had provided adequate resources for the investigation,
preparation, and litigation of the case, the attorney representing the inmate
in the state proceeding is in the best position expeditiously to prepare the
case for federal court. On the contrary, when the federal court must ap-
point new counsel, time and money are wasted while the new attorney
rereads the record, re-investigates the case, and redrafts the pleadings.253
The PCDOs may also, and do, directly act as counsel for death row
inmates. 4 However, one of the greatest services they provide to the
248. Id. at 3. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia are the jurisdictions with PCDOs. Id.
(app. B).
249. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(2)(B) (1994).
250. DEFENDER REPORT SERvicEs, supra note 229, at 4.
251. Id.
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administration of justice and the expenditure of reasonable costs in the
inmates' representation is to ensure that the inmates' cases have smooth
and orderly transitions from state court to federal court with competent,
knowledgeable counsel."' The transitions from death penalty trial to
the state and federal review can be critical to fair determination. One
of the critical problems of the review system prior to the establishment
of the PCDOs was that prisoners often could not obtain qualified coun-
sel until their executions were imminent - when the execution dates
had been set.256
"The resulting last-minute rushed litigation" that races against the
state-imposed execution dates "disserves the inmates, and saps the
strength of the judiciary." '257 Often the last minute habeas corpus peti-
tions result from the unavailability of qualified counsel at earlier times,
and on other occasions it appears that the delays are intentional and
are used as a tactic; nevertheless, the petitions usually do not get the
"careful and deliberate" review that should be received without the
pressure of an imminent execution. 8 Robert Streetman, executed in
Texas in 1988, was assigned an appellate attorney six days before his
execution. 9 "By that time it was too late for the attorney to do any-
thing. 26 ° PCDOs can ensure a continuity of representation and com-
bat the injustice of a state-imposed death penalty sanction without time
for a full review.26" '
255. States that impose deadlines for post-conviction filings by setting execution dates
contribute to the cost of representation of death row inmates. These dates compress the time
that attorneys have to prepare pleadings and lead to resources being expended on hastened
expert review, travel to file petitions, and transportation of documents. The setting of exe-
cution dates also results in hastily prepared filings that often call for amending and frequent-
ly require the attorneys to prepare state and federal petitions simultaneously. DEFENDER SER-
VICES REPORT, supra note 229, at 3.
256. THE POWELL REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 5.
257. Id. at 1.
258. Id. at 5.
259. Magagnini, supra note 192, at Al.
260. Id. (quoting University of Texas Law Professor, Scott Howe).
261. Even then the sheer volume of death penalty cases sometimes overwhelms the
PCDOs. In Texas, petitioner Frank McFarland was given an execution date of September 27,
1993, and later had it modified to October 27, to allow the Texas PCDO to recruit a volun-
teer attorney. On October 16, the PCDO asked the court to appoint an attorney because it
had been unable to recruit volunteer counsel. The trial court refused. McFarland filed a pro
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PCDOs fill the gap existing between the death row inmates' direct
state reviews and their federal habeas corpus petitions. Death row in-
mates were left on their own to exhaust their state collateral appeals by
the Supreme Court's decision in Murray v. Giarratano62 PCDOs re-
cruit attorneys who handle the inmates' cases from trial through all
appeal levels, helping to alleviate the piecemeal nature of the practice
and giving the death row inmates adequate representation at all stages
of the case. An attorney who handles a case in the state system is the
"best positioned to expeditiously prepare the case for federal
court." '263 Indeed, PCDOs have saved money and time by saving fed-
eral courts from appointing new counsel who have to reread the re-
cord, re-investigate the case, and redraft pleadings. 64 They further as-
sist the system by assuring that issues are not inadvertently waived
because of the inadequacy of representation. They also assure that the
sentences, whatever they are, are appropriate.
A. The Background of PCDOs
PCDOs, originally known as "Death Penalty Resource Cen-
ters," '265 had their birth in the judicial habeas corpus quagmire of
1987, when the ever-increasing numbers of death row prisoners and
their capital cases were coming to federal court for habeas corpus
review through "hastily [drafted emergency motions] for [stays] of
se motion with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for a stay and appointment of counsel.
That motion was denied. On October 22, McFarland filed pro se petitions in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Texas seeking appointment of counsel and a stay of
execution to file a writ of habeas corpus. On October 25, again, his request was denied. On
October 26, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied McFarland's application for a stay of
execution. Just before this ruling a volunteer attorney was found by the court. However, on
the eve of the execution, the attorney's petition to the U.S. District Court was found to be
insufficient and the stay was denied. On October 27, just before the execution, the Supreme
Court granted McFarland's stay of execution. McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2768 (1994).
262. 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
263. DEFENDER SERvICES REPORT, supra note 229, at 5.
264. Id.
265. In January 1995, the Death Penalty Resource Centers were renamed Post Convic-
tion Defender Organizations by the Defender Services Committee of the Judicial Conference
to reflect the recommendation of the Subcommittee on Death Penalty Representation's recom-
mendation that the Centers increase their direct representation of death row inmates and not
limit themselves to consultation services. Id. at 2 n.4.
[Vol. 98:863
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execution filed by volunteer counsel recruited serendipitously only days
before. 266 Federal courts were swamped and found themselves putt-
ing aside caseloads to review these emergency filings because many of
the states had "ill-funded defense systems [that] failed to provide suffi-
cient numbers of seasoned defense attorneys for trial and subsequent
state appeal.2 67 As a result, cases were improperly handled, and often
counsel were difficult to find for any proceeding following the direct
appeal.268 States simply had no mechanism for matching qualified
counsel with indigent death row inmates, so the task of recruiting vol-
unteer counsel fell to "small, non-profit legal services organizations,
national civil rights groups, the American Bar Association and lone
citizens.2 69 The American Bar Association noted in 1988 that "there
simply are not, and will not be, enough [qualified attorney] volunteers"
to handle the death row cases generated by the states.7
In 1988, Congress responded to the chaos of the system and the
complaints from the bench and the bar by mandating the right to coun-
sel for death row inmates in habeas corpus proceedings."' The death
row inmates were also provided the right to investigative and expert
services to aid in their petitions.272 This provision set minimum stan-
dards for the counsel appointed273 and allowed the courts to set fees
for the counsel, experts and investigators at any rate "the court deter-
mines to be reasonable to carry out [this requirement to appoint coun-
sel, experts and investigators]." '274 This provision had the effect of
stimulating interest in the bar in handling habeas corpus petitions by
266. Letter from George H. Kendall, Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense & Edu-
cational Fund to Steven G. Asin, Deputy Chief, Defender Services Division, Administrative
Office of the United States Courts 1-2 (Nov. 27, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Kendall Letter]; Marcia Coyle, Republicans Take Aim At Death Row Lawyers, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 18, 1995, at Al.
267. Kendall Letter, supra note 266, at 2 (footnotes omitted).
268. Id.
269. Id. (footnotes omitted).
270. Greenhouse, supra note 176, at 8 (citing amicus curiae brief of the American Bar
Association in Murray v. Giarratano).
271. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (1994); Kendall Letter, supra note 266, at 3.
272. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(A) (1994).
273. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(6)-(7) (1994).
274. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(10) (1994).
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adequately compensating attorneys for their time and providing the re-
sources needed to do the job.
275
Congress then created a center to aid those who do not practice
death penalty litigation regularly. Congress recognized that the
"complexity and. demanding" nature of the practice called for litigation
resources to encourage participation in this type of litigation, and
sought to ultimately improve the quality of cases being reviewed by
state as well as federal courts by recruiting attorneys for the cases in
the state system who would continue with the cases when they went
over to the federal system on habeas review.2 77 "Congress thus under-
stood that the quality of [the trial and] review afforded in the state
system had a direct bearing upon the cost, speed, and integrity of sub-
sequent federal review. 2 78 The PCDOs were encouraged to seek state
funding so they could assist volunteer death penalty counsel in state
trials and post-conviction proceedings.2 79 This coordination of the
state and federal. process was crucial to the success of an operable and
sensible system of review.
B. Leveling the Playing Field
The presence of the PCDOs has encouraged private attorneys,
recruited by the Resource Centers, to handle death penalty cases. Gary
Nelson had the benefit of an Atlanta law firm assuming his case after
eleven years on death row and having his conviction reversed; Nelson
was freed from death row when the prosecution's case was shown to
have been "impeached and contradicted" on every material fact.280
That law firm, Bondurant, Mixon & Elmore, was recruited to Mr.
Nelson's cause by a PCDO.28'
The Alabama Capital Resource Center, a PCDO, was instrumental
in recruiting the Philadelphia law firm of Drinker, Biddle & Reath to
275. Kendall Letter, supra note 266, at 3.
276. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(2)(B) (1994).
277. Kendall Letter, supra note 266, at 3.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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handle a death penalty case in Alabama in 1990.282 The law firm's
attorney who took on the case noted that "I had never handled a capi-
tal case before. Without the center there to provide some comfort level
that we could go forward with their expert assistance, I'm not sure,
from a quality standpoint, that Drinker, Biddle would have been will-
ing to allow me to take the case." ' George Daniels, convicted of
murder in Alabama, was on death row in the state for six years until
the Alabama Capital Representation Resource Center took on his case
in 1989, won a new trial for him and got him off of death row.
2 84
Douglas Robinson, the post-conviction attorney for Frederico Mar-
tinez-Macias, responded to an appeal by the American Bar Association,
but relied heavily on the Texas PCDO.285 Robinson, of Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom's Washington, D.C. office, stated that
"'[t]he Texas PCDO was 'invaluable' because it has the benefit of
knowing all of the cases in Texas, which was helpful in telling us
what happened in another case that could be useful to us.""'86 Macias
spent nearly 10 years on Texas' death row and almost forfeited his life
for a crime he could not later be shown to have committed, but is now
free because of the help of a PCDO. Curtis Lee Kyles was convicted
in Louisiana of the shooting death of a New Orleans woman during a
robbery on September 20, 1984.287 After the trial, it was learned that
the prosecution had suppressed evidence that would have demonstrated
to the jury that two of the eyewitnesses were unreliable, that "damning
physical evidence" was "subject to suspicion," and that the principal
witness gave inconsistent information that undermined his credibili-
ty.2 8 The evidence withheld by the prosecution caused the Supreme
Court to "have serious reservations about whether the State has sen-
tenced the right man. '289 The defendant had been denied relief until
282. Coyle, supra note 266, at Al.
283. Id.
284. Lis Wiehl, Program for Death-Row Appeals Facing Its Own Demise, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 1995, at A13.
285. Coyle, supra note 266.
286. Id.
287. Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1573-75 (1995).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1565 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d 806, 820 (5th Cir. 1993) (King, J.,
dissenting)).
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the Louisiana Resource Center stepped in and helped convince the
Supreme Court that the state's actions violated due process; Kyles'
conviction was reversed and remanded by the Court.2 9
On February 3, 1984, a black inmate of the Missouri State Peni-
tentiary was stabbed to death. Three white inmates, including Lloyd
Schlup were charged with the murder. Schlup's court-appointed attor-
ney was paid a total of $2,000 for fees and expenses in Schlup's 1985
trial.291' The attorney spent forty hours on pre-trial investigation and
preparation and failed to spend significant time with his client in trial
preparation.29 2 Schlup was convicted and sentenced to death.293 His
post-conviction appeals lasted for eight years, and during this period
his court-appointed appellate counsel never visited him for interviews,
and like his trial counsel, failed to privately interview key witnesses to
the murder. 294 Schlup's habeas corpus court-appointed attorney never
interviewed or visited Schlup, "didn't do any real investigation on the
case," and pointed out that being assigned to handle a death row ap-
peal "means you can't take cases that will pay you money until you
complete your death penalty case .... "295 Sean O'Brien of the Mis-
souri Capital Punishment Resource Center entered the case in Decem-
ber of 1991.296 He interviewed numerous inmates and guards who ex-
onerated Schlup,. and found the key witness who established that a
videotape conclusively demonstrated that Schlup was in the prison
cafeteria at the time of killing.297 On November 15, 1993, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals denied the Resource Center's habeas corpus
petition on Schlup's behalf.298 In dissent, Judge Gerald Heaney ob-
served that "Schlup has presented a strong case of actual innocence,"
nevertheless, "this court tells Lloyd Schlup in regard to his conviction:
[y]ou may indeed be innocent, but you are not innocent enough early
290. Id.; Coyle, supra note 266, at Al.
291. Stuart Taylor, Jr., He Didn't Do It, AM. LAW., Dec. 1994, at 68, 70.
292. Id.
293. See Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
294. Taylor, supra note 291, at 73-75.
295. Id. at 75.
296. Id. at 76.
297. Id. at 74-77.
298. Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 1993).
910 [Vol. 98:863
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enough."'2 99 Schlup was scheduled to die on November 19, 1993. He
came within eight hours of execution for this killing, before Missouri
Governor Mel Carnahan granted a stay of execution to allow a hearing
into the mounting evidence of Schlup's innocence gathered by the
Resource Center."' On January 23, 1995, the Resource Center con-
vinced the Supreme Court that the evidence of Schlup's innocence
needed to be considered, thus they vacated his death sentence and
remanded the case for hearings.3°'
In Monroeville, Alabama, the site of Harper Lee's novel To Kill A
Mockingbird, Walter McMillian was charged with the killing of an 18-
year-old white female store clerk in 1987.302 McMillian was not a
popular figure in the town, because he was a black man who had been
dating a white woman.3 3 At the time of the crime, McMillian was
with friends and relatives, a fact discounted by the jury at trial.04
Upon his arrest, McMillian was held on death row. 3 5 No physical
evidence linked McMillian to the killing; however, there were three
people who linked him to the murder.3' 6 At trial, he was convicted
and sentenced to death by the presiding judge, who overruled the rec-
ommendation of life imprisonment by the jury.30 7 A year after
McMillian's conviction, while McMillian was awaiting his execution,
Bryan A. Stevenson of the Alabama Capital Resource Center entered
the case .3" All three witnesses recanted their testimony and one stat-
ed that he was pressured by prosecutors to implicate McMillian.0 9
Stevenson demonstrated that key exculpatory information was sup-
pressed by the state, casting serious doubt on McMillian's guilt, and
convinced the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate
299. Id. at 752, 754 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
300. Taylor, supra note 291, at 70.
301. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 869.
302. Anthony Lewis, A Needed Mockingbird Killed, GREENSBORO NEWs & REc., Aug.
14, 1995, at A7.
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McMillan's death sentence, reverse his conviction, and remand the case
for a new trial.310 On November 22, 1992, the case appeared as a
story on the CBS television show 60 Minutes and the state agreed to
investigate its handling of the case.31' One week after the court's de-
cision, the state of Alabama decided not to pursue a new trial, admit-
ting that it had made a mistake, and McMillian was set free.312
The PCDOs have made death penalty litigation significantly differ-
ent than it was prior to 1988. They have "made prosecutor's jobs
tougher . . . . For the first time in many cases you have a highly spe-
cialized lawyer up against a highly specialized prosecutor, both of
whom do this work all the time. It's a level playing field that some
prosecutors are not used to." '313 The former attorney general for the
state of Texas, Jim Mattox, noted that the PCDOs, which operated on
"a shoestring,"costing less than half of the cost of private attorneys
appointed by the court, were "steeped in the complex and specialized
law of death penalty" cases and were able to handle emergency ap-
pointments promptly, and therefore, should have conservatives love
them "because they make the. death penalty faster and cheaper" and
liberals love them "because decent lawyers . . . help guard against the
execution of innocent people and the violation of constitutional liber-
ties." 4 Mr. Mattox felt that funding PCDOs was a "no-brainer."3"'
Despite their seeming effectiveness, Congress did not "love" what
PCDOs were doing for the criminal justice system.
C. The Elimination of PCDOs
Supporting the death penalty to gain political mileage has been a
staple of American politics for some time now. For example, state
gubernatorial races in Texas and Florida in 1990 featured candidates
who supported the death penalty as the centerpiece of their campaigns
310. McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933, 946-48 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
311. Innocence, supra note 87, at 9-10.
312. Id. at 10; Lewis, supra note 302.
313. Coyle, supra note 266, at Al.
314. Jim Mattox, Want to Execute Killers? Then Pay Their Lawyers, USA TODAY,
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to show they were tough on crime. 16 The attorneys who help thwart
the efforts of death penalty proponents by vigorous and zealous repre-
sentation of the politically unendowed death row inmates become tar-
gets for the political backlash. "This is an easy one for the politicians
who want to look tough on crime. '  The backlash has been effec-
tive.
The effectiveness of the PCDOs has earned a harsh reaction from
death penalty proponents."' Congress has paid heed. South Carolina
Attorney General Charles Condon, testifying for the National Associa-
tion of Attorneys General, urged Congress in the spring of 1995 not to
fund PCDOs unless state prosecutors got equal funding." 9 Condon
argued that "[t]hese lawyers have become lobbyists whose only goal is
to stop executions at any cost."32 The Texas PCDO has been criti-
cized for obstructionist goals, but director Mandy Welch noted such
charges "generally represent the reaction to a vigorous defense bar in
capital cases.""32 Nick Trenticosta of the Louisiana PCDO noted
"[t]he [Lloyd] Schulp and Curtis Kyles cases are not cases 'where
somebody is hanging onto so-called technicalities to stay alive. It took
a lot of lawyer time and resources to show the court just what was
going on in these cases."'322 Welch observed that:
316. RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., MILLIONS MISSPENT: WHAT
POLITICIANS DON'T SAY ABOUT THE HIGH COST OF THE DEATH PENALTY 13 (1992).
317. Wiehl, supra note 284, at A13. The political problems for death row inmates are
not limited to career politicians. In thirty-two of the states that have the death penalty, state
judges run, campaign and are elected to the bench. Their willingness to implement the death
penalty is often key to retaining their positions. In recent years, sitting judges in California,
Mississippi and Texas have lost reelection bids to opponents who have come out for harsher
use of the death penalty. WITH JUSTICE FOR FEW, supra note 69, at 9; Bright & Keenan,
supra note 20 at 760-65; see Lavelle, supra note 173, at 34.
318. PCDOs have never had universal support. The Subcommittee on Death Penalty
Representation of the Judicial Conference of the United States heard complaints that PCDO
staff worked to abolish the death penalty rather than recruit attorneys or represent inmates.
In Texas, as an example, it was common to hear that PCDO representation was too zealous,
that they raised meritless claims, and that their aim was simply to delay the proceedings.
DEFENDER SERVICES REPORT, supra note 229, at 6 n.12.
319. Coyle, supra note 266, at Al.
320. Wiehl, supra note 284, at A13.
321. Coyle, supra note 266, at Al.
322. Id.
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Initially, district attorneys were not accustomed to someone interfer-
ing in their handling of death penalty cases after trial and direct appeal.
To them, our lawyers represented undue interference and delay. It made
their work a lot more difficult, and because our lawyers were not in the
local community, it was easy to demonize them. If anything, that has
decreased.323
A call from Condon to Representative Bob Inglis in April of 1995
prompted a bill in Congress to eliminate the PCDOs 24 Representa-
tive Inglis, a Republican from South Carolina, and Representative
Charles Stenholrn, a Republican from Texas, persuaded the Subcommit-
tee of the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, to eliminate
funding for PCDOs.325 The two congressmen, in an open letter to
their congressional colleagues in June 1995, assailed the PCDOs as
"'one of the major reasons that justice is being frustrated in capital
cases around the country' and blamed 'the flow of federal money [to
the PCDOs] that goes to finance endless and fruitless appeals.' '
326
On January 5, 1996, Congress passed HR-1358, which was signed
into law on January 6, 1996, and called for a budget of $262,217,000
for the Federal Judiciary's Defender Services, so long as none of the
funds are expended on Death Penalty Resource Centers or PCDOs after
April 1, 1996, to allow for an orderly termination of this program.327
This appropriations bill is for the fiscal year 1996, which ends Septem-
ber 30, 1996. After that date, funding for the PCDOs will end.
Assistant Attorney General of North Carolina, Joan Byers, stated
that with the elimination of PCDOs, "[o]ur state courts would appoint
counsel as they are required to do and the federal courts would appoint
members of the private bar ... [to handle death penalty cases and
post-conviction appeals]. 328  Interestingly, with the defunding of
PCDOs and the dismantling of their offices, there has not been a cor-
323. Id (quoting Mandy Welch).
324. Wiehl, supra note 284, at A13.
325. Coyle, supra note 266, at Al.
326. Id.
327. Act of Jan. 6, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-91, 110 Stat. 7.
328. Coyle, supra note 266, at A25.
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responding dismantling of the specialized and trained habeas corpus
units of state attorney generals' offices in the belief that these death
penalty appeals can be handled by any attorney on staff.329 Represen-
tative Inglis has stated "we should not be spending federal dollars to
subsidize think tanks run by people whose sole purpose is to concoct
theories to frustrate the implementation of the death penalty," and he
noted that eliminating the centers and PCDOs would save the govern-
ment $20 million per year.3 However, the economy he cites is a
false one.
D. The False Economy of Eliminating PCDOs
Judge Richard Arnold, Chief Judge for United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, has predicted that elimination of the
PCDOs will significantly increase delays in handling an ever-increasing
death penalty caseload by creating an insufficient pool of qualified and
experienced attorneys to handle the petitions.33' Chief Judge Arnold
estimated that the cost of representing death row inmates would rise
from the current expenditure of $21.2 million to "between $37 million
and $51.1 million" with the elimination of the PCDOs.332 The pre-
dicted increase for the taxpayers is substantial, making the apparent
savings gained by the elimination of the PCDOs illusory.
Chief Judge Arnold has noted that:
[The courts] are required by law to appoint and pay counsel in death
penalty cases ... and we think [PCDOs and Death Penalty Resource
Centers] are the cheapest and best way to deliver service. If these centers
are eliminated the cost to the taxpayer will go up because we will have to
pay private attorneys $75 to $100 per hour, as compared to the $55 per
hour we pay the centers' lawyers.333
329. Kendall Letter, supra note 266, at 4 n.8.
330. Wiehl, supra note 284, at A13.
331. Letter from the Honorable Richard S. Arnold, Chief Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, to The Honorable Harold Rogers, Chairman, Subcommittee
on the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives 1 (July 18, 1995) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Arnold Letter].
332. Id.
333. Wiehl, supra note 284, at A13.
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About half of the 3,000 plus prisoners on death row are represent-
ed or assisted by PCDOs, at a cost to the government of about
$17,200 per inmate, versus an average cost of $37,000 for appointment
of private counsel 4.3 " Bryan Stevenson, the director of the Alabama
Capital Representation Resource Center who saved Walter McMillian
from an undeserved death, received an annual salary of $28,000 in his
position after eleven years of handling death penalty appeals and re-
ceiving a MacArthur Foundation award for his work in 1995. 335
Stevenson is an attorney with a wealth of experience and talent work-
ing for a fraction of what he could command otherwise; he makes it
evident that Judge Arnold is correct that the PCDOs were cost-effec-
tive. Further, the presence of the PCDOs and their efforts in recruiting
private firms to take on representation, frequently secure representation
of death row inmates at no charge to the state or federal
governments." 6
There is no question that the bill the state taxpayers foot for death
penalty trials is substantial. In California, it has been estimated that
administering six death penalty sentences per year would cost $15
million per execution.337 While it costs approximately $930,240 to
imprison an inmate for "life" in California,38 the state spends approx-
imately $10 million per year reimbursing its counties for expert wit-
nesses, investigators and other costs of death penalty trials. 9 Death
penalty trials last longer and cost more than murder trials, and in 1988
it was estimated that the people of California would spend more than
$78 million on death penalty trials - before state appeals and habeas
corpus petitions - than if the trials had been murder trials.4 A
334. Carol J. Castaneda, Death Penalty Centers Losing Support, Funds, USA TODAY,
Oct. 24, 1995, at 3A.
335. Wiehl, supra note 284, at A13.
336. DEFENDER SERVIcES REPORT, supra note 229, at 7 (stating that in fiscal years
1993 and 1994, only 29 lawyers in the state of Florida representing death row inmates on
habeas corpus petitions submitted vouchers to the government requesting reimbursement).
337. This includes fees paid to the prosecutor and defense counsel, court costs and
incarceration on death row. Magagnini, supra note 192, at Al.
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death penalty appeals case in California routinely takes five years from
trial to appellate decision in the state's supreme court and typically
takes about one thousand hours of attorney time per year on behalf of
a death row defendant, at a cost of approximately $162,000.341 Since
most death row inmates are indigent, the taxpayers of California bear
this cost and the high court in California reviews about thirty new
death penalty cases per year.342
In Texas, the trial and appeals of a death row inmate, which take
.an average seven and one-half years to complete, cost the taxpayers an
average of $2.3 million per case, versus $750,000 for the non-death
penalty case. 43 By contrast, imprisoning a Texas inmate in a single
cell at the highest security for forty years is estimated to cost approxi-
mately $750,000.344 Maryland will spend approximately $36,000 more
per death penalty trial than it does on a murder trial.345 The state of
North Carolina has estimated it spends $2 million per execution, versus
$300,000 to house a prisoner for life.346 In Kansas, it has been esti-
mated that it will cost taxpayers an additional $116,700 for the trial
and sentencing in a death penalty case versus a standard murder tri-
al, 347 and in excess of $50 million by the time the 100 inmate death
row facility has been built and the first person executed in the
state.3 48 The state of Florida can anticipate that its taxpayers will pay
approximately $3.2 million per execution.
49
Judge Arnold predicted that closing the PCDOs will not help re-
duce the federal budget but will cost more.35' Estimations per case
skyrocket when it is taken into account that the poor quality of defense
attorneys appointed to a case almost guarantees that on appeal, the trial
341. Id.
342. Magagnini, supra note 192, at Al.
343. Christy Hoppe, Executions Cost Texas Millions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8,
1992, at IA.
344. Id.
345. Dave Von Drehle, Bottom Line: Life in Prison One-Sixth As Expensive, MIAMI
HERALD, July 10, 1988, at 12A.
346. Monk, supra note 88, at 1 lA.
347. Id.
348. Magagnini, supra note 192, at Al.
349. Von Drehle, supra note 345, at 12A.
350. Arnold Letter, supra note 331, at 1.
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will be ordered retried. The second trial will require a second series of
state and federal post-conviction reviews. The taxpayers again will be
saddled with the burden of covering this expenditure of resources,
while also covering the expenses of a backlogged court system and
prosecutors who perform the same function twice. The PCDOs helped
recruit, provide, and back competent trial counsel which helped ensure
that ineffective assistance of trial counsel issues did not undermine
death penalty verdicts.
States have been required to provide counsel to death penalty
inmates since 1.932."' As a result, the money has to be paid to se-
cure counsel for capital defendants. Spending it cheaply, so as not to
adequately compensate or attract qualified counsel, and unadvisedly on
counsel who are ill-prepared or poorly trained for capital litigation,
simply means 'having to do the trial and appeals again. "A 'totally
inadequate indigent defense system early in the process' is responsible
for the trial errors that create delay in the process . . ., '[t]he tragedy
is [members of Congress] know this is a terrible problem and what do
they do? They make the remedy more complicated and withdraw from
the field the first real lawyers these people often get.' '"352 Indeed,
some members of the prosecution side agree. The Attorney General for
the state of Maryland stated, "[t]he scales of justice demand a level
playing field, with highly qualified counsel for both the state and the
accused, . . . [w]e're not talking about a shoplifting case where there
might be a $100 fine.,
353
Justice Blackmun opined in his dissenting opinion in McFarland v.
Scott:
Our system of justice is adversarial and depends for its legitimacy on the
fair and adequate representation of all parties at all levels of the judicial
process. The trial is the main event in this system, where the prosecution
and the defense do battle to reach a presumptively reliable result. When
we execute a capital defendant in this country, we rely on the belief that
the individual was guilty, and was convicted and sentenced after a fair
trial, to justify the imposition of state-sponsored killing. And when this
351. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
352. Coyle, supra note 266, at Al (quoting George Kendall).
353. Wiehl, supra note 284, at A13.
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Court curtails federal oversight of state court proceedings, it does so in
reliance on the proposition that justice has been done at the trial level. My
24 years of overseeing the imposition of the death penalty from this Court
have left me in grave doubt whether this reliance is justified and whether
the constitutional requirement of competent legal counsel for capital defen-
dants is being fulfilled. It is my hope and belief that this Nation soon will
come to realize that capital punishment cannot morally or constitutionally
be imposed. Until that time, however, we must have the courage to recog-
nize the failings of our present system of capital representation and the
conviction to do what is necessary to improve it.354
The elimination of PCDOs returns the system to the day where
qualified death penalty counsel were difficult to obtain. Congress had
neither the courage nor conviction envisioned by Justice Blackmun.
Our society is worse off for this lack of moral fortitude.
E. The Aftermath of the Defunding Decision
The closing of the PCDOs has taken some of the country's most
notable and experienced death penalty and habeas corpus attorneys and
staff out of the trial arenas. The result is fewer competent death penal-
ty attorneys at a time when more death penalty inmates than ever need
appointed representation. The NAACP Legal Defense & Educational
Fund (LD & EF) has noticed a reluctance on the part of the private
bar to become involved in death penalty post-conviction proceedings
because the PCDOs are not there as a resource to help them through
the increasingly complex practice. 55 The LD & EF also noticed that
in states where the PCDOs had already closed their doors, there has
been no one to step into the breech to identify qualified counsel for
indigent death penalty prisoners in state direct appeals.356 In the state
of California, the state Supreme Court took over recruitment of capital
defense lawyers from the state's PCDO, the California Appellate Pro-
ject, before the defunding decision because it felt the center was delay-
ing recruitment of attorneys to delay litigation.357 However, the court
has had difficulty finding qualified counsel to represent their death row
354. 114 S. Ct. at 2790.
355. Kendall Letter, supra note 266, at 5.
356. Id.
357. Coyle, supra note 266, at Al.
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inmates. 5' Congress is making habeas corpus practice more complex
with a series of amendments that would quicken the review process,
but there is no group out there mastering the body of law for the ben-
efit of death row inmates and those who volunteer to help them in
their appeals." 9
Congress has created a climate to return to the chaos found in the
court systems prior to 1988. It has also taken away the one real oppor-
tunity that indigent death penalty inmates had to secure competent
counsel.
V. CONCLUSION
Anthony Lewis, in an opinion piece for the New York Times,
noted:
The right to a competent lawyer is the mark of a civilized society. I know
of no action by the radical Republicans as uncivilized, as indecent as
[closing the PCDOs]. It reminds me of what Joseph N. Welch said to
Senator Joseph McCarthy: "Until this moment, Senator, I think I never
really gauged your cruelty or your recklessness.""36
The defunding of the PCDOs, in effect, denies death penalty in-
mates their right to counsel. Most states have not implemented a sys-
tem, equivalent to their prosecutorial units, capable of providing death
penalty defense counsel that match, or even come close to, the experi-
ence and the resources of the prosecution.
The statistics on who is chosen to die indicate that those who are
chosen for the death penalty do not appear to be "one of us." Imposi-
tion of the death penalty today is reminiscent of a time when this
country used vigilante law and lynching to express moral outrage. The
community feels it is making an example of "someone else" as to what
will be tolerated in its jurisdiction. The concern is not to make sure
that the proper person is executed or that his punishment is "fair."
358. Id
359. ld.
360. Anthony Lewis, Cruel and Reckless, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 11, 1995, at A2.
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Justice Brennan made the point that to separate "ourselves" from those
who suffer the death penalty is moral folly:
It is tempting to pretend that minorities on death row share a fate in no
way connected to our own, that our treatment of them sounds no echoes
beyond the chambers in which they die. Such an illusion is ultimately
corrosive, for the reverberations of injustice are not so easily confined...
and the way in which we choose those who will die reveals the depth of
moral commitment among the living.36'
A country that expresses social outrage by imposing the death
penalty must summon the moral character to mete out the punishment
in a manner that is fair and equitable. Society must treat these defen-
dants as if they are innocent, as if they are one of their own, as each
of us would want to be treated if charged with a capital offense. Leg-
islatures must provide competent counsel to make sure the trial is the
event that reveals the truth and that post-conviction review is mean-
ingful. This article has cited numerous instances where defendants were
wrongly accused and wrongly convicted. There are many instances
where the defendants have committed the horrible crimes of which they
are accused, but many are innocent - just like us. Legislatures must
provide a service like the PCDOs or find some other means to train
and fund those who will take on the necessary representation to ensure
that death penalty trials are, in practice, a search for the truth.
361. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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